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“For some of us it is performance, for others patronage.  They are two sides of the same coin or, being as 
there are so many of us, the same side of two coins.”  --The Player, Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead
I. Introduction
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court set forth the prevention of “the actuality 
and appearance of corruption” as a legitimate and (in the case of contributions) 
compelling government interest in the regulation of campaign finance,1 a holding that 
was emphatically reaffirmed in the Court’s recent BCRA decision.2 Buckley goes on to 
say:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid 
pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our 
system of representative democracy is undermined….  Of almost equal 
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of 
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 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).  
2
 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 656 (2003)
2appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions.3
Though the opinion as a whole – and, specifically, the invalidation of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act’s (FECA) expenditure limits on First Amendment grounds – has 
been assailed by many proponents of campaign finance reform,4 the anti-corruption 
rationale remains vibrant and, with Buckley’s contribution/expenditure distinction, has 
shaped the campaign finance landscape of the past twenty-five years.5  Most recently, the 
Court in McConnell v. FEC upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) ban 
on soft money (non-federal funds to party committees, unregulated by FECA) in federal 
elections,6 recognizing that “the prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a 
3
 424 U.S. at 26-27.
4
 Criticisms come in large part because of the way in which the ruling has been perceived to broaden 
untenably the concept of money as protected speech.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Exchange; Speech in the 
Welfare State: Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 291 (1992) (likening the Buckley decision 
unfavorably to Lochner v. New York); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and 
Campaign Finance, 86 Geo. L. J. 45, 46 (1997) (characterizing Buckley as “one of the most widely scorned 
decisions in the recent history of the court”); Burt Neuborne, Campaign Finance Reform: The 
Constitutional Questions: Buckley’s Analytical Flaws, 6 J.L. & Pol’y 111, 115 (1997) (opining that 
“Buckley and the rules it fostered are responsible for much of what is wrong with our current political 
structure”). 
5
 Both the rationale and the distinction have also come under fire as going too far in regulating campaign 
finance, rather than not far enough.  See, e.g., Robert F. Bauer, Going Nowhere Slowly: The Long Struggle 
Over Campaign Finance Reform and Some Attempts at Explanation and Alternatives, 51 Cath. U. L. Rev. 
741 (2002) (arguing that there is little empirical evidence that corruption is a real problem, and disfavoring 
the contribution/expenditure distinction because it slights associative political rights).  Additionally, some 
commentators have suggested that other rationales than corruption should be the concern of campaign 
finance reform.  See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 1369 (1994) (discussing the promotion of equality and the unshackling of politicians from 
fundraising duties as valid reasons for reform, rather than the prevention of corruption).
6
 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA, also known as the McCain-Feingold Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-155, 116 Stat. 181 (2002).  See also Michael J. Malbin, Thinking About Reform, in LIFE AFTER 
REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 8-11 (Michael J. Malbin, ed.) 
(2003); The Center for Responsive Politics, “Federal Campaign Finance Law: New Contribution Limits,” 
at http://www.opensecrets.org/basics/law/index.asp (last visited August 8, 2005).  For a critical summary of 
BCRA’s basic soft money provisions, see Richard Briffault, Soft Money Reform and the Constitution, 1 
ELEC. L. J. 343 (2002).  For a broad history of the constitutional issues surrounding campaign finance pre-
BCRA, see D. Bruce La Pierre, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Political Parties, and the First 
Amendment: Lessons from Missouri, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 1101 (2002); Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance 
Reform: Relevant Constitutional Issues, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 1123 (2002).  For an analysis of the likely impact 
of BCRA and McConnell, see Jonathan S. Krasno and Frank J. Sorauf, Evaluating the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 121 (2003); Craig Holman and Joan 
3sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.”7  The torrent of soft 
money seems largely to have been stemmed,8 but unlimited donations given to party 
organizations are still legal in a number of states, subject only state regulations and to 
BCRA’s restrictions on state party activity during a federal election.9  Ostensibly, such 
money is used only for grass-roots, “party-building” purposes.10  Absent evidence to the 
contrary, there is no reason to infer that party-building monies constitute part of an 
impermissible quid pro quo transaction.  By giving money to the party itself, the 
argument goes, a donor is simply increasing that party’s resources and, in so doing, 
attempting to advance in a generalized way the interests and policies that best align with 
the donor’s own11 – just as, by giving money to a candidate, a donor is trying to 
maximize that candidate’s chances at victory, and displaying a democratic preference for 
Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign Finance Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the 
McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2004).
7
 124 S. Ct. at 660.
8 See Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel Ortiz, Trevor Potter, and Frank Sorauf, CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK, 163-77 (1997) [hereinafter “Sourcebook”] (chronicling the rise of soft 
money contributions); The Center for Responsive Politics, “The Rise and Demise of Soft Money,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/toporgs/soft.asp (last visited August 8, 2005).  Part II, infra, relates the 
ways in which unregulated donations continue to make an impact at the federal level.
9
 As of June 2004, fifteen states allowed unlimited contributions from any source to state party committees.  
See National Conference on State Legislatures, “Limits on Contributions to Political Parties,” available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/contrib_pol_parties.htm (last visited August 10, 
2005)[hereinafter “State Party Contribution Limits”].  Note that in North Dakota and Pennsylvania, 
corporations are prohibited from donating directly to a state party organization, but may do so through a 
segregated fund.  N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (2005); 25 PS § 3253 (2005).  Some predict that the 
success of BCRA will lead more states to ban soft money.  See, e.g., Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at 
n.5.  Since the legitimation of BCRA, several states have already taken additional measures to regulate the 
campaign finance process, enacting ‘pay-to-play’ statutes that “ban or limit state and local political 
donations of employees who work for companies that bid for government contracts.”  Kate Ackley, ‘Pay to 
Play’ Fix is Backed By House, ROLL CALL, March 15, 2005 (describing such legislation in New Jersey, 
South Carolina, Ohio, and West Virginia); see also Joseph Picard, GOP undecided on pay-to-play bill, 
ASBURY PARK PRESS, February 27, 2005, at AA1 (reporting on New Jersey’s efforts).  
10 See Sourcebook, supra note 8, at 163.
11
 Supporters of soft money credit its use with “a resurgence of the role of parties in national elections,” and 
characterize it as “an essential means of promoting citizen participation in the political process.”  Id. See 
also 124 S. Ct. at 777-81 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that banning donations to political parties 
burdens speech “that does not have the potential to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders,” and that 
parties, inter alia, “foster speech crucial to a healthy democracy . . . and fulfill the need for like-minded 
individuals to ban [sic] together and promote a political philosophy.”) (emphasis and citations omitted).
4them over other alternatives.12  Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s understandable caution 
in the matter, it is not necessary to assume that donors to parties or to candidates do so to 
seek specific ex post influence following the election; there are plausible reasons that do 
not raise the specter of actual or perceived corruption, and for which the case for 
regulation under Buckley and McConnell is murky at best.
But these reasons are surprisingly flimsy when it comes to one of the most 
peculiar and, arguably, prevalent features of the current campaign finance system: the 
practice of a single donor, whether on the state or federal level, giving sizeable 
contributions to multiple parties, or to two candidates competing for the same office, 
within a given election cycle.13  Here it makes no sense to say that the donor is just 
exercising a democratic preference for a particular party or candidate; rather, by giving to 
competing parties or candidates, the donor appears to be hedging its bets so that whatever 
the outcome of the election, it will enjoy some benefit from its donation by having 
backed the winner.14  As the McConnell Court observed, in finding that soft money 
contributions “have a corrupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption,”15
12
 What I term “democratic preferences” in this paper is similar to the “ideological sorting” theory 
propounded by, among others, Steven G. Bronars & John R. Lott, Jr., Do Campaign Donations Alter How 
a Politician Votes?  Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?, 40 J. 
L. & ECON. 317, 347 (1997) (presenting evidence that “[j]ust like voters, contributors appear able to sort 
into office politicians who intrinsically value the same things they do.”).
13
 This practice, here termed “bet-hedging,” has received surprisingly little attention in the literature, 
earning only passing mention in papers concerning themselves with other campaign finance issues.  
Representatively, see Kurt D. Dykstra, Sending the Parties “PAC-ing”?  The Constitution, Congressional 
Control, and Campaign Spending After Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal 
Elections Commission, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1201, 1230 (1998) (“Some PACs will even contribute to the 
‘general funds’ of both political parties, although usually the amounts given to each are not equal.  In a 
sense, this strategy might well be characterized as a ‘hedging all bets’ strategy: PACs want to be sure that 
they do not end up entirely on the wrong side of the election so they will contribute to both candidates.”); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
1705, 1714 (1999) (“The unflattering reality is that campaign expenditures are intended not only to 
influence voter behavior but to curry favor with sympathetic elected officials…. [H]ence, the propensity of 
many institutional actors to hedge their bets and contribute on both sides of important elections.”).
14
 Although for shorthand purposes the term “bet-hedging” is used throughout this paper, and although all 
commentators appear to assume that donors who give to both parties do so in order to mitigate the 
5Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the 
top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national 
parties, leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were 
seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any 
particular ideology.16
This paper contends that, to the degree that such bet-hedging occurs, it carries with it a 
strong prima facie implication of ex post favor- seeking in a way that contributions to a 
single party or single candidate do not, and, therefore, can (constitutionally) and should 
(normatively) be regulated or prohibited under the Buckley framework by Congress or by 
state legislatures.  Further, it argues that the free speech and associative rights inherent in 
hedged-bet donations do not outweigh the potential threat that such donations pose to the 
legitimacy of the political system or the public’s perception thereof; only the possible 
effects of bet-hedging regulation on broader donor behavior militate against legislative 
action.17
To put the bet-hedging phenomenon plainly: Mr. Dem and Mrs. Gop are running 
against each other for a seat in the Senate.  If Donor X, who has $40 to contribute, gives 
it all to Mr. Dem’s campaign, it’s fair to infer that Donor X is displaying a preference for 
Mr. Dem as a candidate (or for his party, platform, haircut, or stance on some issue, 
which all amount to the same thing here).  Similarly, if Donor Y gives its $40 to Mrs. 
Gop’s campaign, the reasonable conclusion, assuming Donor Y is a rational actor, is that 
uncertainty of democratic politics and assure that they will be backing the winner, it is important to note 
that hedged-bet donations are most likely made for a number of reasons, several of which have nothing to 
do with an expectation of ex post benefits.  Moreover, to the extent that some donors do engage in strategic 
bet-hedging behavior, pinpointing the degree to which bet-hedging occurs overall is very difficult: 
donations made to each party in exchange for quid pro quo benefits from the victor (probably 
impermissible under Buckley), for example, are in practice essentially indistinguishable from donations 
made to each party in exchange for generalized access (probably permissible under Buckley).  The problem 
of parsing the prevalence of and motivations for hedged-bet donations is explored at greater length in Parts 
III and IV, infra.
15
 124 S. Ct. at 661.
16 Id. at 663 (emphasis in original).
6it prefers Mrs. Gop over Mr. Dem.  But suppose Donor Z gives $20 to one candidate and 
$20 to the other.  What conclusion may be drawn from that?  If the answer is that Donor 
Z has no preference between the candidates, then why would Donor Z give any money at 
all?  Insofar as the purpose of campaign contributions is to advance the electoral 
prospects of one candidate or party over another, giving to both sides is an irrational act; 
because elections are zero-sum, the contributions cancel each other out.18  However, if 
some donors contribute not simply to signal a preference, but in order to secure ex post
benefits, it makes sense for those donors to give to both candidates.  As long as either 
side can give Donor Z the benefits it seeks in exchange for a donation, and as long as the 
winning candidate will provide Donor Z with the hoped-for benefits even if Donor Z 
contributed to both sides,19 Donor Z is acting perfectly rationally by hedging its bets and 
seeking to ensure a return on its investment.
Of course, behavior that is rational for a private donor might not be normatively 
desirable for society as a whole.  And when the amounts being given to both sides are not 
usually $20, but $1 million – per donor, per election cycle – one presumes that the 
expected ex post benefits must be significant.20  Whether the actual benefits accrued live 
up to donors’ expectations, and whether either actual or expected benefits rise to the level 
17 See Part V, infra.
18
 Rather, the contributions cancel each other out if an equal amount is given to each side.  If more money 
is given to one side than the other, then only the difference between the contributions matters in the end.  
That is, if $x is given to Candidate A and $x+y is given to competing Candidate B, only the donor’s 
contribution of $y to Candidate B matters.
19
 That is, whether donors who give to both sides receive fewer ex post benefits relative  to “loyal” donors 
who give to only one side – a consideration that is explored further in Part IV, infra.
20
 Such numbers are, of course, an approximation of data examined more carefully in Part III, infra, and 
reflect the pre-BCRA landscape of escalating soft money contributions to both major party committees.  
The true calculation of dollars that will be spent in hedged-bet donations in the wake of the McConnell
decision is still largely uncertain; we are nearing the end of the first campaign cycle under BCRA.   
However, as will be seen in Part II, there are several reasons to think that donors will continue to find ways 
to give substantial amounts of money to competing candidates and parties, even if certain outlets have been 
closed.
7of “political quid pro quo [undermining] the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy,”21 is certainly contestable.  Nevertheless, the phenomenon surely deserves a 
more searching analysis than it has thus far received.
Part II of this paper briefly sketches the present state of campaign finance 
regulation, explains why bet-hedging is an issue even in the wake of BCRA’s ban on 
federal soft money, and lays out the general arguments for and against campaign reform.  
Part III differentiates bet-hedging, in which competing parties or candidates are given 
money in order to secure ex post benefits, from donation-splitting, in which alternative 
explanations exist for similar behavior, and tries to determine the prevalence of the 
former.  Part IV raises a number of issues not heretofore explored regarding the practice 
of bet-hedging, including a) the motivations behind bet-hedging; specifically, why donors 
decide to give to competing parties or candidates, and what ex post benefits such donors 
might seek; b) the process by which a donor decides how to split its money; c) 
informational concerns inherent in bet-hedging; and d) how the closeness of an election 
might change the degree to which donors are likely to hedge their bets.  Part V analyzes 
the possibility of regulating hedged-bet donations, both as a normative matter (should the 
behavior be regulated?) and as a legal matter (can the behavior be regulated? how can the 
regulations be most narrowly drawn?), testing the practice of bet-hedging against the 
traditional arguments for unregulated political contributions.  It concludes that, so long as 
it is possible to distinguish instances of true bet-hedging from other, more benign forms 
of political speech, regulation of hedged-bet donations is constitutional under Buckley’s 
anti-corruption rationale.  Normatively, however, the question is much tougher.  While 
the prevention of the appearance of corruption almost certainly is a constitutionally 
21
 424 U.S. at 26.
8sufficient justification for burdening the speech of donors who are hedging their bets, 
such a burden will carry with it costs and consequences that may outweigh the positive 
aspects of regulation.  These consequences, as with the motivation behind and 
effectiveness of the practice of bet-hedging itself, are unfortunately far from clear.  
II. The Campaign Finance Landscape
A. Bet-Hedging post-BCRA
When the Supreme Court upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, it 
legitimized an earthshaking change upon the campaign finance landscape, the most 
significant since the passage of FECA thirty years before.  The effects of BCRA were felt 
immediately: most notably, national party soft money is now banned; individual 
contribution limits have been doubled, to $2,000 per cycle, and indexed for inflation; and 
state, district, and local party committees operate under federal contribution limits for 
elections in which a federal candidate is on the ballot.22  Although the practice of bet-
hedging, I will argue, raises normative concerns in any context, it is tempting to think that 
these reforms, by putting paid to million-dollar donations and other campaign finance 
excesses, will remove much of the taint from donors’ decisions to give to both sides.  If 
the bulk of bet-hedging in the past has come through enormous soft money contributions, 
and such contributions are now banned in federal elections, one might suppose that the 
undesirable aspects of bet-hedging will diminish in turn.23
22
 This last is subject to the Levin Amendment exception, which allows state and local committees’ voter 
registration and get out the vote efforts to be “funded with soft money, limited to $10,000 per source, if 
such contributions are allowed under state law.”  Malbin, supra note 6, at 8.
23 See, e.g., Editorial, A Victory for Campaign Reform, THE OREGONIAN, December 11, 2003, at C8 (“On 
balance, though, the McCain-Feingold law will be good for the political process. American democracy will 
not miss the corrupting influence of soft money. It created a system of legalized bribery in which the major 
parties regularly put the arm on large corporate donors, who often felt compelled to give to both sides,
either to win influence or avoid retaliation in Congress.”).
9Suppose it is true that a $25,000 check to each national party committee (the most 
an individual can contribute to a national committee under the new rules) is less cause for 
concern, analytically, than a $250,000 check.  There are still several conduits, post-
BCRA, through which large sums can be transmitted from donors to political 
organizations; those accustomed to hedging their bets in a big way can, and will, still do 
so.24  Indeed, despite the ban on soft money, total giving to national party committees in 
the 2004 election cycle exceeded 2000’s record-breaking totals.25
National party conventions, for example, have become “the chief means that 
corporate donors have found to make large contributions to organizations benefiting 
political parties” following BCRA’s ban on soft money.26  An exemption from campaign 
finance laws for donations going to a party’s local “host committee,” originally intended 
“to help promote local businesses,”27 has attracted numerous donations of $1 million or 
more from corporations, labor unions, and non-profit foundations.28  Many of these 
donors, moreover, are giving generously to both parties’ conventions – The New York 
Times reports that of the 73 major donors listed for the Republican National Convention 
as of June 2004, “20 have also given to the Democratic National Convention.”29  Large-
scale bet-hedging is alive and well after BCRA.
24
 As the McConnell Court observes, “[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet.”  124 S. Ct. at 706.      
25
 David Broder, A Win for Campaign Reform, Editorial, WASHINGTON POST, February 3, 2005, at A27 
(stating that “the national party committees together raised $1.2 billion in hard money (regulated 
contributions) in the 2004 election cycle, $140 million more than they had raised in hard and soft money 
combined for the 2000 contest.”).
26
 Michael Slackman, GOP Nearing Money Record for Convention, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 17, 2004, 
at A1.
27 Id.
28 See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Thomas H. Edsell, For Lobbyists, Big Spending Means Big Presence, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, July 28, 2004, at A1.
29
 Slackman, supra note 26, at A1.
10
Another avenue of potential private largesse is the proliferation of 527 groups, 
ostensibly independent, tax-exempt advocacy organizations, to which donors, including 
corporations and labor unions barred from contributing to parties and candidates, may 
give unlimited amounts of money.30  So called after the section of the Internal Revenue 
Code that grants the groups their tax-exempt status,31 527s are officially “unaffiliated” 
with a party or candidate (such a designation is more fictive for some groups than others) 
but spend their money electioneering, engaging in voter mobilization, issue ads, and get 
out the vote efforts in order to forward their particular policy preferences.32  While 527s 
have often comprised the political arms of unions and trade associations, the 2004 
election cycle saw the strengthening of unabashedly partisan interest groups under the 
527 umbrella, “the explicit purpose [of which] is to pick up where the national parties and 
federal officeholders left off – that is, to raise huge sums of soft money from 
corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals” and to spend that money “promoting and 
attacking candidates.”33  For example, two Democratic interest groups working in 
concert, The Media Fund and America Coming Together, combined to raise over $140 
million in their efforts to defeat President Bush in the 2004 election.34  With 527s 
spanning the political spectrum, donors have no shortage of options if they wish to 
continue to make contributions in excess of the BCRA limits.35
30 See Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at 238 (arguing that 527 groups have “undermined the objective 
of BCRA”).
31
 I.R.C. 527 (2002).
32 See Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at 247-48.
33 Id. at 249.
34
 The Center for Responsive Politics, “527 Committee Activity: Top 50 Organizations,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp (last visited August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “527 
Committees”].
35
 Interestingly, there are indications that bet-hedging is not nearly as prevalent among donations to 
opposing 527 groups as it is for competing parties or competing candidates.  The implications of this are 
examined in Part IV, infra.
11
Finally, as earlier noted, state elections are governed by state law and state 
contribution limits, at least when no federal candidate is on the ballot.  Twenty-seven 
states do not limit contributions by individuals to state party committees; twenty-nine do 
not limit contributions by PACs.36   Fifteen states allow unlimited donations by 
corporations or unions,37 both of which have been prohibited from contributing to federal 
elections for decades.  The point is not necessarily that state elections are particularly 
wild or woolly, or that the influence of big money holds some sort of special sway in 
races for governor or assemblyman.  Craig Holman and Joan Claybrook believe that 
states will soon follow the lead of BCRA and institute far more stringent contribution 
limits.38  They may well be right; indeed, in recent years a number of states have, even 
before the passage of McCain-Feingold, severely tightened campaign giving restraints.39
But for now, money still flows liberally into the campaign coffers of state campaigns, and 
bet-hedging behavior occurs with apparent frequency.40  Whether such behavior is 
sufficiently worrisome to deserve regulatory attention is one thing (and for this 
discussion, see Part V) – but to all appearances it does exist, and will continue to exist in 
some substantial form even despite the sea change caused by BCRA.    
36
 State Party Contribution Limits, supra note 9.
37 Id.
38
 Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at n.5. As mentioned in note 9, supra, the pay-to-play legislation 
enacted by several states may be one indication of a renewed willingness to combat corruption at the state 
level through campaign reform.
39
 Alaska’s broad-based 1996 reforms, for example, were upheld by its Supreme Court in State v. Alaska 
Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000).  And Louisiana barred an 
entire industry from making campaign contributions.  La. R.S. 18:105.2(L) (1999).  The resultant case, 
Casino Ass’n of Louisiana v. Louisiana, 820 So.2d 494 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003), in 
which the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the ban, is discussed in Part V, infra.    
40 See Part III, infra.
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B. Arguments For and Against Campaign Finance Reform
In a 2002 paper, Robert Bauer characterizes the post-Buckley campaign finance 
debate as afflicted with “muddled ferocity.”41  The truth of this characterization is due in 
large part to the ideological rigidity with which both sides approach the issue; the law 
review articles, Senate speeches, and op-ed pieces on the subject, while not lacking in 
impassioned rhetoric, leave little sense even that the terms of the debate have been 
mutually defined.  More precisely, it is unclear what outcome, aside from “less money in 
politics,” most reformers want – what problems, aside from the inchoate bugaboos of 
“corruption” and “improper influence,” such reform, in its particulars, is designed to 
address.42  And from the other side, repeated and single-minded appeals to free speech 
often serve to obscure what is in many respects a subtle and complex set of issues.43  Nor 
have the Supreme Court’s periodic forays into the doctrinal arena done much to make the 
foundation for debate any clearer.44
41
 Bauer, supra note 5, at 749.
42 See Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Legalism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 111, 
111 (1995) (observing that “[m]any recent analyses of [campaign finance issues] rely on vaguely defined 
moralistic terms such as ‘corruption,’ ‘unfairness,’ and ‘trusteeship’”).
43
 Indeed, the “money-is-speech” talk itself appears willfully to ignore the substantive core of the Buckley
holding: that money-as-speech, like speech, may be regulated if the governmental interest is sufficiently 
compelling.  That Buckley specifically singles out contribution limits as a valid exercise of government 
regulation is paid little heed by those scholars and politicians who invoke the First Amendment, and its use 
by the Court in the portion of Buckley striking down ceilings on expenditures, to advocate that such 
contribution limits be repealed or that further restrictions are by definition unduly burdensome of liberty or 
speech interests.  See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Needs No Reform: 
Protecting Liberty from Campaign Finance “Reformers,” 51 Cath. U. L. Rev. 785 (2002); Debate on the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 148 Cong. Rec. S2096 [hereinafter “BCRA Debate”] (March 
20, 2002) (Statements of Sens. Hutchison, Gramm, Stevens, and McConnell).  But see Neuborne, supra
note 4, at 115-16 (criticizing the Court’s contribution-expenditure distinction as “logically untenable and 
pragmatically disastrous” in part because it treats contributions as worthy of less First Amendment 
protection).
44 See FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 
(1996); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).  In 
2003, the Court also denied certiorari in Casino Ass’n of Louisiana v. Louisiana, 820 So.2d 494 (2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003) (where the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the state’s outright 
prohibition on campaign contributions from the casino industry, holding that prevention of corruption and 
13
Nevertheless, certain stock arguments for and against proposed reforms to 
campaign finance recur with some regularity, and certain basic contentions have been 
agreed upon by all (or nearly all) parties.  First, proponents of a more restrictive system 
of campaign finance argue that new campaign finance laws will be, or should be, 
designed with one or more of four goals in mind: 1) the mitigation of corruption or 2) the 
appearance thereof; 3) the facilitation of political fairness, as manifested in equality of 
participation, access, or influence;45 and 4) the maximization of political autonomy, in 
freeing politicians from the burden of perpetual fundraising and donors from the burden 
of perpetual giving.46  Each of these goals, by extension, also serves to increase popular 
confidence in the democratic legitimacy of the government.  Furthermore, implicit in the 
call for reform is the belief that the furtherance of these goals outweighs countervailing 
interests of free speech, associative rights, and the aggregation of democratic preferences.
Similarly, opponents of restrictive campaign finance laws rely on several 
objections: 1) that campaign contributions advance democracy by allowing donors to 
back those candidates or parties whose preferences or policy goals most nearly match 
their own;47 2) that campaign finance regulation represents an unconstitutional abrogation 
of freedom of speech; and 3) that campaign finance regulation limits a donor’s right to 
political association.48  Implicit in these arguments is a belief that the threat to free 
the appearance of corruption was a sufficient interest to allow a prohibition on contributions in this case).  
Casino Ass’n is discussed further in Part V, infra.  
45 See Cain, supra note 42, at 130-39 (discussing equity issues – fairness of participation, influence, and 
outcome – in the context of campaign finance regulation).
46 See Cain, supra note 42, at 124-25 (noting lobbyists’ claim that legislators extort campaign 
contributions); Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1055, 1068 (1999) (arguing that campaign contributions and expenditures are not truly 
voluntary).  
47 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 5, at 1373-75 (arguing that displaying preferences through contributions is 
in many ways similar or even superior to displaying preferences through votes).
48 See Bauer, supra note 5, at 750-53 (discussing campaign finance and associative rights).
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speech, free association, and aggregative preferences presented by campaign finance 
reform outweighs any benefits that such reform might produce.  This implication takes 
shape in the final, overarching objection of reform opponents: that there is no campaign 
finance crisis, and that concerns about corruption, fairness, legitimacy, or autonomy are 
overwrought, abstract, and largely unsubstantiated49 – in short, that the current volume of 
money in campaigns presents no empirical problem sufficient to justify limits (or tighter 
limits) on contributions or expenditures.50
With these competing arguments in mind, this paper considers bet-hedging and its 
regulation only in the context of currently compelling governmental interests in 
regulating campaign finance; that is, per Buckley and its progeny, the legitimate 
restriction of campaign contributions in order to prevent corruption or the appearance 
thereof.51  Therefore, while considerations of fairness and autonomy no doubt play a part 
in a normative analysis of donors contributing to both sides at once, this paper raises 
these concerns only tangentially,52 focusing instead on the degree to which such 
contributions are suggestive of potentially corrupt ex post favor-seeking.  And while the 
49
 Or, in the case of “appearance of corruption,” that it is the reformers themselves who are creating the 
crisis of legitimacy – that appearance of corruption, absent corruption itself, is only a problem if it is 
broadcast as such to the public at large.  See, e.g., BCRA Debate, supra note 43 (statements of Sens. 
Gramm and McConnell); Rich Lowry, The Campaign Finance Smear, National Review (February 12, 
2000).
50 See Bauer, supra note 5, at 744-48 (arguing that the “corruption” argument for reform is not empirically 
founded); Cain, supra note 42, at 114 (characterizing the question of whether or not contributions influence 
the actions of legislators at all, let alone in such a manner as to constitute corruption, as a “lively topic of 
dispute”).
51 See McConnell v. FEC, supra note 2, at 656 (reaffirming the government’s interests “in preventing both 
the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the 
electoral process through the appearance of corruption) (internal quotations omitted); FEC v. National 
Conservative PAC, supra note 44, at 496-97 (noting that “preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling governmental interests thus far identified for restricting 
campaign finances”).
52
 In fact, because this paper assumes the legitimacy of Buckley’s contribution limits, the goal of alleviating 
politicians’ fundraising burdens may run counter to the direction of this analysis; the need to constantly 
raise funds is arguably much greater in a world where the amount a single donor can give is capped.
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prospect of regulating hedged-bet contributions will be tested against the full suite of 
arguments against reform, it is important to note that the prevention of corruption is a 
baseline point with which almost every participant on either side of the campaign finance 
debate agrees: that is, you will find virtually no argument that, as a general matter, 
“corruption” should not be proscribed.
The trouble comes, of course, in defining what constitutes corruption and 
pinpointing the ways in which it can be seen to occur – but here, again, both sides seem 
to concur that bribery or other forms of explicit quid pro quo transactions, in which 
money is given with the promise or reasonable expectation of a specific and personal 
material gain, are verboten.53  Indeed, quid pro quo favor-seeking cuts directly against the 
argument that campaign contributions are manifestations of democratic preference: if a 
donor is giving money in exchange for anticipated services rendered, its stake in the 
process is materially different than if it is merely picking the candidate or party that best 
matches its preferences and attempting to maximize their chances of victory.  And when 
a donor contributes to competing parties or candidates, the likelihood that it is simply 
manifesting its preferences as between democratic alternatives is vanishingly small: a 
donor giving to both Bush and Kerry during the 2004 election could not have helped both
candidates win.  That donor’s dual contribution makes sense only if a) it expected to gain 
something from the eventual winner other than a generic advancement of mutual policy 
53 But see Strauss, supra note 5, at 1372-73 (arguing that even direct quid pro quo campaign contributions 
are, in themselves, neither inherently corrupt nor inherently objectionable).  It should be noted that bribery 
qua bribery is illegal under the relevant statutes regardless of campaign finance law. The difficulty in 
defining corruption occurs in more ambiguous transactions, whereby campaign contributions are traded for 
access or influence rather than outright promises that a legislator will vote a certain way on a certain bill.  
And contributions-for-access, even on a quid pro quo basis, arguably present no legal problem.  See Ian 
Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for 
Political Influence, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 837, 844 at n.21 (quoting then-Attorney General Janet Reno).  The 
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goals, and b) rather than trying to effect a particular outcome to the election, it simply 
wished to ensure that it would have backed the winner, whoever that turned out to be.
This paper, then, presents a very simple thesis: contributions made by one donor 
either to both parties in a given election cycle or to two candidates competing for the 
same office carry with them a uniquely strong prima facie implication of ex post favor-
seeking.  Furthermore, to the degree that such contributions are made in order to hedge 
the donor’s bets (rather than other possible strategic reasons, explored in Parts III and 
IV), they may not be justified through the invocation of democratic preferences.  Finally, 
because donations made in order to secure ex post benefits implicate concerns of 
corruption and undue influence, hedged-bet behavior can and perhaps should be regulated 
under the Buckley framework.
III. The Prevalence of Bet-Hedging
Before reaching the question of whether donors who give money to both parties 
or to competing candidates within an election cycle are doing so in order to hedge their 
bets (discussed in Part IV) or whether such behavior is normatively undesirable and may 
constitutionally be regulated (discussed in Part V), it is first necessary to establish an 
empirical foundation for the existence of hedged-bet donations – that is, how common is 
this kind of behavior?
That contributions to competing candidates or competing parties do occur is 
beyond dispute.  It is commonplace to open the newspaper at any point in the election 
problem of separating access from influence in the context of the regulation of bet-hedging is discussed in 
Parts IV and V, infra. 
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cycle and see accounts of donations being split in races for the presidency,54 the Senate,55
the House,56 state legislatures,57 governorships,58 lieutenant governorships,59 state 
treasurer,60 county commissioner,61 and the mayor’s office.62  Donations are split to 
national conventions,63 to party committees64 and to competing candidates,65 in general 
54 See, e.g., Richard S. Dunham & Susan Straight, More Corporate Chiefs Are Hedging Their Bets, 
BUSINESS WEEK, March 6, 2000, at 42 (“[M]any pragmatic CEOs want an open door at the White House 
whichever candidate emerges victorious.”).
55 See, e.g., Sean Cockerham, Alaska business community supports Hawaii incumbent, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, October 29, 2004, at A1 (donor giving money to Alaska senator Lisa Murkowski and her 
Democratic challenger).
56 See, e.g., Susan B. Glasser & Juliet Eilperin, GOP Scrambles to Counter Business’s Aid to Democrats; 
‘Bet Hedging’ Evens Campaign Committee Gifts, WASHINGTON POST, November 10, 1999, at A6 (quoting 
lobbyist saying, “The prevailing mood downtown is: This could go either way.  We better make sure our 
interests are protected no matter who’s in control.”)
57 See, e.g., Peter Baker, Va. Companies Paying to Win in Election; Large Firms Give Similar Amounts to 
Both Sides in Battle for Legislature, WASHINGTON POST, October 31, 1995, at C1 (firms donating to both 
parties in state legislature race).
58 See, e.g., Keith Griffin, Firm Leaders Hedge Their Political Bets; Some managing partners cover their 
bases. For others, it’s all or nothing, CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE, November 1, 2004, at 1 (donating to 
multiple candidates in Connecticut gubernatorial race).
59 See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Giving to Both Sides Is Seen as a Safe Bet, NEW YORK TIMES, April 
6, 1998, at A16 (In race for Texas Lieutenant Governor, “some $300,000 of the $4.5 million had come 
from a hundred or so wealthy individuals and political action committees that hedged their bets and gave 
equally to each candidate.”). 
60 See, e.g., Matthew Frank, In Treasurer’s Race, Any Edge Helps, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 28, 
2004 (banking industry giving to candidates in both parties).
61 See, e.g., Jason Garcia, Donors Spread Wealth Between Rival Camps, ORLANDO SENTINEL, October 8, 
2004, at B1 (bet-hedging in Florida county commissioner race).
62 See, e.g., Matt Carter, Campaigns raise more than $105,000, TRI-VALLEY HERALD (PLEASANTON, CA.),
November 1, 2004 (bet-hedging in local mayoral race); Eric Lipton, Hevesi Leads in Money From, and 
Returned To, Intermediaries, NEW YORK TIMES, July 19, 2001, at B1 (“[T]he city’s real estate industry is, 
as planned, hedging its bets in the mayor’s race by spreading dollars among the candidates…”).
63 See, e.g., Slackman, supra note 26, at A1; “Executive Excess 2004: Campaign Contributions, 
Outsourcing, Unexpensed Stock Options and Rising CEO Pay,” available at
http://www.faireconomy.org/press/2004/EE2004.pdf, at 13 (“Of the 69 convention sponsors, 29 supported 
the [2004] Democratic convention only, 24 sponsored the [2004] Republican convention only, and 16 
companies chose to hedge their bets by sponsoring both conventions.”). 
64 See, e.g., Chris Mulick, Kennewick, Wash.-area campaign donations are triple the amount from 2000, 
TRI-CITY HERALD, October 31, 2004 (Washington State companies giving to both parties); Ruth Marcus & 
Charles R. Babcock, Parties’ National Committees Set Records for ‘Soft Money’; Much Is Used for Ads 
Indirectly Promoting Candidates, WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 1996, at A8 (“And some companies hedged 
their bets.  Anheuser-Busch Inc. gave $100,000 each to the DNC and RNC, as did Joseph E. Seagram & 
Sons…. MCI Gave $140,000 to Republicans and $100,000 to Democrats.”).
65 See, e.g., Eric Krol, Some Donors Hedging Bets in Pursuit of Political Clout, THE DAILY HERALD, 
September 1, 2002, available at http://www.ilcampaign.org/news/somedonors9-1-02.html (donor giving 
$25,000 to each gubernatorial candidate).
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elections66 and in primaries.67  They come from lobbyists,68 lawyers,69 CEOs,70 industry 
PACs,71 casinos,72 sports team owners,73 and horse breeders,74 in campaigns in New 
York,75 Washington, D.C.,76 Virginia,77 Illinois,78 Florida,79 and elsewhere.80  Moreover, 
66 See, e.g., Adam Clymer, House Democrats Have Money Edge on GOP, NEW YORK TIMES, June 11, 
2000, at A30 (“[Donors] know it will take a net gain of only six Democratic seats to install Democrats in 
House positions of power, so they are giving to both sides.”).
67 See, e.g., GOP Donors Not Playing Favorites, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 21, 1995, at 14 (wire 
service report) (donors giving to multiple GOP presidential candidates).
68 See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobbyists Spread Campaign Cash; Bush, Kerry Have Benefited Since ’97, 
THE WASHINGTON POST, May 6, 2004, at A8 (“Several lobbyists and lobbying firms were careful to hedge 
their bets and donate to both candidates.”); Don Van Natta, Jr., Lobbyists are a Lode for the Leading 
Presidential Campaigns, NEW YORK TIMES, June 22, 1999, at A21 (“Most major lobbying firms have 
hedged their bets by having partners raise money for different candidates.  That way, no matter who wins, 
the firms will have helped the winner.”).
69 See, e.g., Saundra Torry, For Both Political Parties, the Bar Tab is Generous, WASHINGTON POST, 
August 19, 1996, at F7 (law firms giving to both national party committees).
70 See, e.g., Richard S. Dunham & Fred Jesperson, Who the Corporate Bosses Are Backing, BUSINESS 
WEEK, November 15, 1999, at 112 (citing 52 of 389 business executives as giving money to presidential 
candidates from both parties in the 2000 campaign).
71 See, e.g., Amy Keller, PACs Hedge Their Bets, ROLL CALL, September 25, 2000 (“With control of 
Congress up for grabs and many House and Senate races too close to call this campaign season, hundreds 
of political action committees are hedging their bets and contributing to both candidates engaged in 
especially tight election contests.”).
72 See, e.g., Nevada’s Senate Race: Hoist the Ensign, THE ECONOMIST, October 28, 2000 (casinos giving to 
competing Nevada senatorial candidates); see also Samantha Young, Thousands in Nevada play political 
money game, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, October 31, 2004, at 1B (gaming and casino executives 
donating to both Bush and Kerry).
73 See, e.g., Greg Andrews, Biz cash fueling election; With race tight, stakes high, executives write huge 
checks, INDIANAPOLIS BUSINESS JOURNAL, October 25, 2004, at 1A (Indianapolis Colts owner Jim Irsay 
contributing $22,500 to each Indiana gubernatorial candidate); Michael Janofsky, Political Points , THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, August 31, 2003, at 26 (Carl Lindner, owner of the Cincinnati Reds, personally 
contributes “substantial amounts to both parties, about two-thirds to Republicans and the rest to 
Democrats.”).
74 See, e.g., Scott Wilson, Margot Williams, & Bridget Roeber, Industrial-Strength Money; Special 
Interests Follow Md. Candidates’ Policies, WASHINGTON POST, October 18, 1998, at A1 (in Maryland 
gubernatorial race, “[b]ankers, doctors, developers, and horse breeders in particular have essentially hedged 
the early bets they placed on the governor out of fear they may prove useless if he loses reelection.”).
75 See, e.g., Stefan C. Friedman, Real Estate Bigs Spread the Wealth in Mayor Race, THE NEW YORK POST, 
January 23, 2005, at 13 (detailing a real estate developer’s contribution of the maximum amount allowable 
under the law to every New York City mayoral candidate but one);
76 See, e.g., Yolanda Woodlee, Chavous Trails Evans in Donations; Both Get Big Sums From Outside City, 
WASHINGTON POST, March 19, 1998, at J1 (donor contributing to multiple D.C. mayoral candidates).
77 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Dan Eggen, Va. Candidates Play to High-Tech Voters, WASHINGTON 
POST, September 17, 2000, at C1 (MCI WorldCom giving $3,000 to competing Senate candidates).
78 See, e.g., Mike Royko, A Lesson in How to Build a War Chest, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, December 13, 1988, 
at 3 (donors contributing to multiple Chicago mayoral candidates, because “[t]here are thousands of people 
who wish to be on good terms with the mayor of Chicago, regardless of who he is.”).
79 See, e.g., John Kennedy, Money race for ’06 heats up, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 17, 2005, at B1 (donors 
giving money to both Republican gubernatorial candidates in Florida).
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commentators, including the Supreme Court,81 seem to believe that such behavior is both 
frequent and wide-ranging within our political system,82 and that it is indicative of a 
desire to guarantee the receipt of ex post benefits.83
Analytically, however, such anecdotal evidence is not ideal.  In order to make the 
case that bet-hedging deserves greater regulatory attention – and, per Part IV, infra, that 
bet-hedging donors are “seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting 
any particular ideology”84 – it would be nice to demonstrate empirically that the practice 
is habitual among large donors.  The most comprehensive available data, collected by the 
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), tell us that most top federal donors give money to 
both Democrats and Republicans.85  Of the top 100 donors in the seven election cycles 
from 1989 to 2002, for example, 79 split their contributions at least 90%-10% between 
the two parties.86  During the 2003-2004 election cycle, the most recent cycle for which 
complete data are collected on national elections, this breakdown is true for 78 of the top 
80 See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 53, at A16 (Texas lieutenant governor race); THE ECONOMIST, supra note 72 
(Nevada Senate race); Sean Wolfe, Election 2002: Contributors Hedge Their Bets, ASHLAND DAILY 
TIDINGS, May 11, 2002, available at http://dailytidings.com/2002/news0511/headline/dt_news-02.php 
(double giving to party committees in Oregon).
81
 124 S. Ct. at 663.
82 See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Common Cause Lists ‘Soft’ Donors, WASHINGTON POST, March 13, 1998, at A23 
(“As always, a number of companies hedged their bets and contributed generously to both sides.  Ten gave 
$100,000 or more to both parties last year…”); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 13, at 1714 (describing 
bet-hedging as a “propensity of many institutional actors”).  But see Kathleen Gallagher, Executives get just 
one vote each, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, September 5, 2004, at 1D (“Charles Franklin, a political 
science professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, says [double giving is] more anecdote than 
truth. He says he analyzed election data from 1990 through 1996 and found that only 0.7% of all 
contributors gave to both candidates in the same race.”).
83 See, e.g., 124 S. Ct. at 663.
84 Id.
85
 The Center for Reponsive Politics, Blue Chip Investors: The Top 100 Donors to Federal Elections, 1989-
2002, “The Top 100 Donors,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/toporgs/topdonors.asp (last 
visited August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “Top Donors 1989-2002]; The Center for Responsive Politics, Blue 
Chip Investors: The Top 100 Donors to Federal Elections, “Appendix: Contributions by the Top 100 
Donors in 2001-2002,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/toporgs/appendix.asp (last visited 
August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “Top Donors 2001-2002”]; The Center for Responsive Politics, “2004 
Election Overview: Top Overall Donors,” at http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topcontribs.asp?
cycle=2004 (last visited August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “Top Donors 2003-2004”].
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100 donors.87  Interestingly, at the federal level only institutional donors (such as 
corporate PACs and trade organizations) appear to split their donations; individuals are 
remarkably consistent along party lines.88  During the 2003-2004 election cycle, for 
instance, only 43 of the top 100 donors split their contributions between the Democratic 
and Republican parties.89  Of those forty-three, thirty-nine gave one party ten percent or 
less of their contribution total.90  Bet-hedging behavior by individual donors appears 
slightly more common in state and local races,91 for reasons that are further explored in 
Part IV.A.     
Although most discussions of split donations assume that cross-party 
contributions are, by themselves, evidence that donors are hedging their bets,92 that 
assumption is insufficient for the purposes of this paper.  To support an inference that 
donors are covering their bases to ensure ex post benefits from the eventual winner, it is 
not enough to show that a donor’s contributions are not confined to a single party.  Bet-
hedging, in which ex post favor-seeking is the most likely explanation for a donor’s 
behavior, must be distinguished from mere donation-splitting, in which there are other, 
more benign reasons that a donor might be giving money across party lines.   
If it is a reasonable inference of ex post benefits that separates bet-hedging from 
donation-splitting, what specific behavior characterizes the former but not the latter?  The 
86
 Top Donors 1989-2002, supra note 85.
87
 Top Donors 2003-2004, supra note 85.
88
 The Center for Responsive Politics,  “2004 Election Overview: Top Individual Contributors,” available 
at http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topindivs.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited August 14, 2005) 
[hereinafter “Top Individual Donors 2003-2004”].
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Wilson, Williams, & Roeber, supra note 74; Carter, supra note 62; Royko, supra note 78.  
92 See, e.g., Mike Allen, Democrats Gain as Business Hedges Bets; House Campaign Arm Leads GOP in 
Money, WASHINGTON POST, October 17, 2000, at A11 (characterizing increased business donations to 
Democrats as bet-hedging).
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strongest presumption of ex post favor-seeking occurs when a donor’s contribution 
cannot be explained as a demonstration of its preference for one party or candidate over 
competing alternatives.  Donations to competing candidates or parties are therefore 
inherently more suspect than a donation to a single candidate or party.  As noted above, 
when Donor Z gives money to competing candidates Mr. Dem and Mrs. Gop, Donor Z is 
not expressing a preference for one over the other; the likelihood is high that Donor Z 
would not give to both sides if it did not expect something from the winner after the 
election, whoever the winner might be.
The gold standard example of bet-hedging, then, is an instance in which a donor 
gives to candidates competing for the same office.  In his article on the 2002 Illinois 
gubernatorial race, Eric Krol notes that “[a]t least 102 contributors have given cash to 
both [Democratic candidate] Rod Blagojevich and [Republican candidate] Jim Ryan in 
the past year.”93  Similarly, in the 2000 Virginia Senate race, MCI WorldCom donated 
$3,000 each to competitors Charles Robb and George Allen.94  And in the 2004 election 
cycle, investment firm Goldman Sachs contributed over $290,000 to John Kerry’s 
presidential campaign and almost $390,000 to the reelection efforts of President Bush.95
Morgan Stanley, UBS Americas, Citigroup, Bank of America, Microsoft, and JP Morgan 
Chase & Co are also among the top twenty contributors to each of the major party 
presidential nominees for 2004.96  Further examples abound.97
93
 Krol, supra note 65.
94
 Shear & Eggen, supra note 77, at C1.
95
 The Center for Responsive Politics, “John Kerry: Top Contributors,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/contrib.asp?id=N00000245&cycle=2004 (last visited August 14, 
2005) [hereinafter “Kerry Donors 2004”]; The Center for Responsive Politics, “George W. Bush: Top 
Contributors,” at http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/contrib.asp?id=N00008072&cycle=2004 (last 
visited August 14, 2005) [hereinafter “Bush Donors 2004”]. 
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Keller, supra note 71 (PACs giving to competing candidates in numerous Congressional races). 
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These are cases where the outcome is zero-sum; either one candidate wins, or the 
other does.  Therefore, it is economically irrational for a donor to give to both sides 
unless it is maximizing its chances of an ex post benefit – that is, unless it believes that 
giving to both candidates will result in a more favorable ex post position than trying to 
help one candidate beat the other.
A presumption of ex post favor-seeking may also be made when a contributor 
makes soft money donations to competing party committees within a single election 
cycle.  Again, because these donations are ostensibly reserved for “party-building,” they 
do not raise the same concerns of undue influence as do contributions to individual 
candidates.  But “party-building,” too, is essentially zero-sum: one party’s share of 
political power must necessarily increase or decrease relative to other parties.  Giving 
money to two competing party committees makes little sense, unless, in the words of a 
GOP lobbyist, the donor is trying to “make sure [its] interests are protected no matter 
who’s in control.”98   In that way, then, Anheuser-Busch’s donations of $100,000 each to 
the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee 
(RNC) in the 1995-96 election cycle99 strongly suggest an expectation of ex post benefits 
(there is one circumstance in which donations to competing party committees is not 
suggestive of ex post favor-seeking; this circumstance is dealt with later in the Part).
To summarize:  if a donor gives money to sources in multiple parties or, in the 
case of party primaries, to multiple candidates within the same party, it is engaging in 
donation-splitting.  Donations that are split between competing candidates or competing 
party organizations within the same election cycle, because they carry with them an 
98
 Glasser & Eilperin, supra note 56, at A6.
99
 Marcus & Babcock, supra note 64, at A8.
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inference of ex post expectations, constitute the most suspect form of donation-splitting, 
here termed bet-hedging.  By contrast, other forms of donation-splitting – for example, 
giving to non-competing candidates of different parties,100 or giving to the national 
committee of one party and candidates of another party – do not necessarily suggest ex 
post favor-seeking,101 and should thus be distinguished from bet-hedging in this analysis.  
Unfortunately, the CRP data do not make this distinction, and it is therefore difficult to 
make a precise empirical determination regarding the prevalence of bet-hedging. 
The remainder of this part is devoted, first, to detailing the ways in which a 
contributor might split its donations without crossing the threshold into presumptive bet-
hedging and, second, to examining how the CRP data might be interpreted in light of the 
donation-splitting/bet-hedging distinction.  While a discussion of donation-splitting 
necessarily touches upon issues of donor motivation, this part does not seek to determine 
what donors hope to gain by hedging their bets, nor how donors decide to apportion their 
split donations.  These issues are explored at length in Part IV.
A. Donation-Splitting
Let’s return to Donor Z.  Assume that all we know of Donor Z’s contribution 
history is that, over the last eight full election cycles (1989-2004), it has given a total of 
$2 million to Democrats and $2 million to Republicans.  Having given equally to both 
major parties, Donor Z is certainly donation-splitting; why can we not also presume that 
it is hedging its bets? 
100 See, e.g., Mike Madden, Daschle gets some GOP money, ARGUS LEADER (SIOUX FALLS, SD), October 
14, 2004, at 5A (Some top Bush donors gave to Daschle’s Senate campaign, but “[n]one of the four 
Rangers and Pioneers who donated to Daschle has contributed to [Daschle challenger John] Thune’s Senate 
race, federal records show.”).
101
 Or, at least, do not do so to any greater degree than campaign contributions generally.
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There are a number of answers to this question.  First, these cumulative totals 
leave open the possibility that Donor Z is not giving to both parties simultaneously, but 
rather switching from one to the other (either on an election-by- election basis or, 
alternatively, gradually and permanently over the course of cycles).  That is, Donor Z’s 
equal split of contributions between the two parties since 1989 says nothing about 
potential bet-hedging if the donor gave 100 percent of its donation monies to the 
Democrats half the time and 100 percent to the Republicans the other half.  This sort of 
behavior makes little sense for donors like the American Trial Lawyers Association 
(ATLA) or the National Rifle Association (NRA) whose ideologies consistently and 
disproportionately dovetail towards one party, but might be a rational donation strategy 
for pragmatic donors wishing to send the entirety of their contribution to the single party 
perceived to be in power in a given election cycle.
Of course, it must be pointed out that such pragmatism itself is in all probability 
unjustifiable under the democratic preferences rationale for campaign contributions.  If a 
donor gives all its money to one party this election cycle and to another party the next, 
it’s much more likely that the donor is using its money to gain favorable ex post policy 
outcomes for itself than that its policy preferences and interests (or those of the two 
parties) have undergone such a rapid shift.  Insofar as ex post favor-seeking is our 
concern, then, a donor’s decision to give to the party in power is no less suspect than its 
decision to give to both parties in order to have given to the party in power (although it is 
a good deal more uncertain).
However, the alternative explanation listed above carries more weight.  If Donor 
Z is not switching donations election by election, but instead has migrated from one party 
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to the other over the course of time, then those donations would be no more suggestive of 
ex post expectations than any other ordinary campaign contribution.  That is, it’s 
perfectly plausible that a donor’s policy preferences can change over time, even to the 
degree that it finds its interests more fully advanced by a different party in 2004 than in 
1989.102
In fact, FedEx Corp provides a real-life example of this kind of gradual shift in 
preference.  From 1989-2004, FedEx gave 57 percent of its total contributions to the 
Republican Party, with 43 percent going to the Democrats.103  But the total amount
donated by FedEx has more than doubled over this period of time, while the amount 
given to the Democrats stayed roughly the same until 2000, where it began a precipitous 
decline.104  As a result of this, FedEx’s giving has shifted dramatically from the 
Democrats to the Republicans.  While FedEx has given at least 40 percent to each party 
in aggregate over the last eight full election cycles, in only one of those cycles was 
giving to each so balanced as to actually exceed 40 percent.105  FedEx’s giving history 
looks like this:106
Election Cycle Percent Given to Each Party
1989-90 64-36, Democrats
1991-92 64-36, Democrats
1993-94 72-28, Democrats
1995-96 58-42, Republicans
1997-98 72-28, Republicans
1999-2000 65-35, Republicans
2001-02 70-30, Republicans
102
 This would, again, be less true of donors whose ideology – and, by extension, party identification – are 
well-defined and fairly fixed in place.  No union, for example, is very likely to be giving the bulk of its 
money to the Republicans in the near future.
103
 The Center for Responsive Politics, Top All-Time Donors, “FedEx Corp,” available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.asp?ID=D000000089 [hereinafter “FedEx Corp”].
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. Through July 2004, FedEx’s contributions in the 2003-2004 election cycle are weighted 69-31 to the 
Republicans.  See Top Donors 2003-2004, supra note 85.
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2003-04 68-32, Republicans
Notwithstanding that it still donated a substantial portion of its money to each party each 
cycle (an issue dealt with in Parts IIIB and IV), the shift in FedEx’s giving is perfectly 
consistent with a legitimate democratic preference of one party over alternatives; there is 
no need to infer ex post favor-seeking in order to find a rational explanation for its 
behavior.  In fact, because the CRP data tell us only how much money FedEx contributed 
to all Republicans and all Democrats during each of these cycles, the likeliest and 
simplest explanation for the contribution shift is that, since the 1994 Republican 
Revolution, there have been more Republicans in Congress than Democrats.  If FedEx 
contributes largely to incumbents, one would expect its donation pattern to reflect the 
change in party control of the House and Senate.107
It should be clear, then, that a donor’s cumulative giving history over several 
election cycles does not provide enough information to conclude anything more than that 
it has split its donations.  If what we know of Donor Z is that it gave equally to both 
parties from the period 1989-2002, we cannot tell whether or not it has hedged its bets; 
that is, per the definition of bet-hedging, whether or not it has given to competing 
candidates or to competing party organizations during the same election cycle.
Does it make matters easier if we know Donor Z’s donations to each side within a 
single election cycle?  Yes, but not much.  Let’s say we know that, from 2001-2002, 
Donor Z contributed $100,000 to Democrats and $100,000 to Republicans.  There are
107 See The Center for Responsive Politics, Blue Chip Investors: The Top 100 Donors to Federal Elections, 
1989-2002, “Shifting Strategies Over the Years,” available at 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/toporgs/strats.asp [hereinafter “Shifting Strategies”] (“contributions to 
Republican candidates jumped significantly after the GOP takeover of Congress in the 1994 elections”).
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several ways in which this giving split might be explained without resort to an inference 
of constitutionally dubious ex post favor-seeking.
First, it may be that Donor Z has given money to different candidates in different 
races.  If Donor Z chooses which candidate it will support in each race on the basis of 
each candidate’s ability to advance Donor Z’s interests if elected, and pays little attention 
to party affiliation, it might easily end up giving to Democratic candidates in certain races 
and Republican candidates in others.  There’s nothing inherently objectionable about this; 
as Ameritech vice-president Gary Lytle commented in 1999, “We normally give to 
people who support our positions.  That includes people on both sides of the aisle.”108
Many donors have interests that cannot be comfortably pigeonholed as “Democrat” or 
“Republican,” but rather span the parties; that they would give to noncompeting 
candidates of different parties should raise no ex post warning flags.109
Similarly, Donor Z might give to the national committee of one party and 
individual candidates of the other party.  Depending on ideological variances within 
parties, a donor’s policy interests might be better served by the election of candidates 
from different parties in different districts, depending on the candidate and on the district, 
even if it normally gives to only one party.  For example, finance company MBNA might 
give some of its money to particular Democratic candidates in an election cycle because 
those candidates happen to have stronger positions – or, if elected, are likely to have 
greater influence – on particular important issues, such as bankruptcy reform or banking 
deregulation, than do their Republican opponents.  This doesn’t change the fact that, in 
108 Big Business Reroutes PAC Money; GOP’s Hold on House Uncertain, So Wallets Open for Democrats, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 16, 1999, at 11 (wire service report).
109 See Shear & Eggen, supra note 77, at C1 (quoting chairman of National Republican Campaign 
Committee that, “A lot of these guys aren’t Republicans or Democrats, they are businessmen.”).
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the main, Republican candidates (and the Republican Party overall) will be most likely to 
reflect MBNA’s preferences and thus will receive the overwhelming bulk of MBNA’s 
money.110
Moreover, the timing of donations often plays a crucial role in supporting an 
inference of ex post expectations.  There is evidence that some donors who split 
donations do so at different stages of the campaign – they will give to one candidate or 
party at first, and if it appears that others to whom they have not donated are doing better 
than expected, will shift donations later in the game in order to cover their bases.  This 
seems especially likely to occur at the end of the campaign, when close races cause late 
flurries of giving as one side finally pulls ahead,111 but may in fact happen any time an 
underdog candidate becomes a serious contender.  For example, many CEOs, having 
already donated to presidential candidates Bill Bradley, George W. Bush, and Al Gore 
the year before, waited until the early spring of 2000, when it became clear that John 
McCain would challenge for the Republican nomination, before sending checks his way 
as well.112  Conversely, donors could spread their money around if it appears that the 
initial target of their contribution is doing worse than expected; witness the 1998 
Maryland gubernatorial race, in which “[b]ankers, doctors, developers, and horse 
110 See The Center for Responsive Politics, “MBNA Corp,” available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.asp?ID=D000000114 [hereinafter “MBNA”].
111 See R.H. Melton, Corporate PACs Gave $424,299 to Gingrich in ’93-94, WASHINGTON POST, April 17, 
1995, at A25 (quoting a campaign finance analyst, with regard to the 1994 elections: “What we saw at the 
end of the campaign was giving to candidates who looked like winners in close races, and those were 
Republicans in many cases.”).  A variation on this strategy involves donors giving to one candidate or party 
during the campaign and, in the event that they bet on the wrong horse, shore up their allegiances after the 
election by giving to the victor.  To the extent that parties are aware that bet-hedging occurs, however, this 
is a particularly risky strategy.  The party in power is more likely to accept a donor as legitimate (and 
confer upon it the desired access, influence, or other benefits) if it contributed during the election, no 
matter how eleventh-hour.  For more on the informational concerns of bet-hedging, see Part IV.
112
 Dunham & Straight, supra note 54, at 42.
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breeders…essentially hedged the early bets they placed on the governor out of fear they 
may prove useless if he loses reelection.”113
What does timing tell us about the donor’s likelihood of ex post favor-seeking?  
Donations that are further apart in time are more plausibly motivated by innocuous 
donation-splitting than donations that are close together.  If Donor Z, having contributed 
$5,000 to each candidate in a Senate race, discloses that the contributions happened 
within days of each other, it is extremely likely that Donor Z is seeking ex post benefits 
from the winner of the election.  There are few alternative explanations for near-
simultaneous giving to competing candidates.114  If, however, the first $5,000 donation 
was made in February and the second in early November, it is difficult to say whether 
Donor Z is hedging its bets.  It may be that the recipient of the second donation emerged 
as a strong enough candidate down the stretch that Donor Z felt justified in covering its 
bets by giving them money.  By contrast, it may be that, over the course of the campaign, 
the recipient of the first donation espoused policy goals that caused Donor Z to reorder its 
preferences and to attempt to maximize the second candidate’s chances of winning; here 
there can be no special ex post inference to be made at all.115  Alternately, Donor Z’s first 
choice may prove a weaker candidate than expected, prompting the donor to shift 
resources to a candidate who, while preferentially second-best, is more likely to win.  
This is an especially likely scenario in races with three or more candidates,116 or where 
113
 Wilson, Williams, & Roeber, supra note 74, at A1.
114 See Part IV.A, infra, for an examination of these explanations.
115 Cf. Patricia Sabatini, Right on the Money; In the Corporate Boardrooms, It’s Bush in a Runaway.  Then 
Again, Republicans Usually Are the Beneficiaries of Business, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, October 3, 
2004, at F-1 (Kerry donor “had a change of heart since Ronald Reagan died” and contributed to Bush).
116 See, e.g., the D.C. mayoral race described in Woodlee, supra note 76, at J1.  There, a donor gave money 
to two competing candidates, both belonging to the Democratic Party.  The article noted that more 
candidates might enter the race – faced with no assurance that these additional candidates would be to its 
30
the donor has contributed money during the party primaries, and is now choosing 
between a pared-down set of candidates.117  And, of course, it may simply be that one 
candidate entered the race later than the other, and Donor Z’s policies and preferences 
align better with those of the late entry.118
Party primaries engender another circumstance in which donation-splitting by 
Donor Z might not rise to the level of bet-hedging.  Consider this: a Business Week study 
in November 1999 found that 52 of 389 executives surveyed had already contributed 
money to presidential candidates in both parties.119  On the face of it, those executives are 
clearly hedging their bets; donations to competing candidates, after all, leave no 
reasonable inference but that the donor seeks ex post benefits.  At this point in the 
process, however, candidates in different parties are not yet truly competing; until the 
primaries have been held, candidates jockey with those in their own party for votes and 
dollars.  Before the primaries, then, it’s entirely possible for rational donors with ordered 
sets of preferences to use their contributions strategically in order to advance the 
prospects of candidates in each party while implicating bet-hedging only in an abstract, 
generalized manner.  
liking, a donor is justified in signaling its preference for multiple candidates, each of whom are more 
agreeable than any likely alternative.
117
 An interesting example of this occurred in Georgia in 2005, when donors who had supported Republican 
Wayne Hill for district commission chairman during an intraparty runoff donated anew to his victorious 
GOP opponent, Charles Bannister, even though Bannister was running against a Democratic challenger 
who was hopelessly financially outmatched.  See Ben Smith, Show me the money: Even in easy election, 
donations roll in, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, June 2, 2005, at 1JJ.
118 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 61, at B1 (“Others say the donations reflect the timing of each candidate's 
entry into the race. Kallinger began his campaign in the summer of 2003, more than a year before the 
election. Coming off two terms as a state lawmaker, he immediately became a favorite and had little trouble 
tapping into Orange County's political fund-raising network. Segal, however, jumped into the race in 
December. And though he has never held elected office, he has made plenty of friends in Central Florida's 
business and development circles through the years. They weren't about to let him campaign empty-handed. 
‘One guy started way before the other guy, and I think that would explain the contributions for some 
people,’ Kantor said, though he did not want to talk about his donations.”).
119
 Dunham & Jesperson, supra note 70, at 112.
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This could manifest itself in one of two ways: 
1) Candidates A and B are competing for the Democratic nomination, and 
Candidates C and D are competing for the Republican nomination.  The donor strongly 
prefers Candidate A to all other candidates, and gauges that, of Candidate A’s possible 
opponents in the general election, Candidate D is demonstrably the weaker.  The donor 
might therefore contribute money to both Candidate A and Candidate D, with the intent 
of pitting its preferred candidate against a weaker opponent after the primaries.  
2) As before, Candidates A and B are competing for the Democratic nomination, 
and Candidates C and D are competing for the Republican nomination.  Of the 
Democratic candidates, the donor strongly prefers A; of the Republican candidates, the 
donor strongly prefers C.  The donor then gives money to each of his preferred candidates 
in the hopes that they win their respective primaries.  If they do, and the donor is 
indifferent as between them, it need not contribute any more; it has effected an outcome 
in which a candidate favorable to its interests will win the election.  If the donor prefers 
one over the other – say, Candidate A over Candidate C – it can then give further money 
to Candidate A in the hopes of advancing his electoral prospects (but with the knowledge 
that, should A fail, C is tolerable as well).  In neither of these strategies does the donor do 
anything but demonstrate its democratic preference for one candidate over another; 
therefore, they cannot be considered bet-hedging per se, and there exists no particular 
suggestion of ex post expectation (again, no more so than for any campaign contribution).
This paper contends that only when a donor gives to competing candidates, or to 
competing parties within a single election cycle, can you be reasonably certain that ex 
post benefits are expected.  There are two circumstances, however, in which even 
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donations to competing candidates or parties might possibly be justified without resort to 
an ex post inference.  Let me close this section by offering and discarding these situations 
as being viable explanations for widespread donor behavior.
First, donations to competing candidates – even if the second takes place soon 
after the first – might be explained by invoking the democratic preferences rationale if, as 
happened in the 2002 New Jersey Senate race, a candidate drops out and is replaced at 
the last minute by someone else.120  In that case, a donor who had given to the now-
deposed candidate could reassess its preferences, decide that the original opponent was 
more likely to advance its policy interests than the replacement candidate, and transfer its 
support.  
Alternately, a donor may find itself giving to competing sides if a candidate who 
has dropped out of a race decides to re-enter.  The 2004 Indiana gubernatorial contest, for 
example, saw Democrat Joe Kernan regarded as his party’s presumptive nominee in 
2001,121 withdrawing his name from consideration in December 2002,122 and changing 
his mind and deciding to run in November 2003.123  As a result, some donors, like 
Indianapolis businessman James Zink, found themselves backing both Kernan and his 
Republican opponent Mitch Daniels.124  Zink, who had contributed $9,000 to Kernan in 
2001-02, developed a donor relationship with Daniels after Kern dropped out of the 
120
 Or one candidate might die mid-race, as happened to Mel Carnahan in the 2000 Missouri Senate race.
121
 Mary Beth Schneider, “Republicans bolt from starting blocks in governor’s race,” THE INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, October 2, 2001, at 1A (Kernan “doesn’t expect to formally announce his campaign until late 
2003”).
122
 Mary Beth Schneider, “Kernan won’t run for governor,” THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, December 9, 2002, at 
1A.
123
 Mary Beth Schneider, “Kernan bounds into race,” THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, November 7, 2003, at 1A.
124
 Matthew Tully and Mary Beth Schneider, “Big-money donors feed spending frenzy,” THE 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, April 4, 2004, at 1A.
33
race.125  When Kern became a candidate again, Zink resupported him.126  Zink gave a 
total of $25,000 to Daniels and $20,000 to Kernan in 2003.127
In situations like these, donation-splitting behavior may legitimately be explained 
without the need to infer untoward motivations on the part of donors.  Such behavior, 
however legitimate, might potentially be deterred by a regulatory response prohibiting 
donations to competing candidates (see Part V).  However, it must be noted that such 
scenarios are extremely rare, and exceptions to bet-hedging regulation covering this 
contingency could easily be crafted.
B. Interpreting the Data
We turn now to the CRP data detailing the giving practices of the top 100 donors 
from the 1989-2002 election cycles and the 2003-2004 election cycle.  Because the data 
do not distinguish bet- hedging from the other forms of donation-splitting discussed 
above, they should be viewed as an imperfect measure of the prevalence of donor bet-
hedging.  With that caveat in mind, it should nevertheless be possible to gain a sense of 
the scope of hedged-bet behavior.
Let’s look first at the giving splits of the top 100 donors cumulatively over this 
period.  As mentioned, 79 of the top donors from 1989 to 2002 split their contributions at 
least 90%-10% between the Democrats and Republicans.128  The NRA, for example, gave 
18 percent of its donations over this time to the Democrats and 82 percent to the 
Republicans, while ATLA gave 88 percent to the Democrats and 12 percent to the 
Republicans.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128
 Top Donors 1989-2002, supra note 85.
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It is interesting that even stringently ideological groups such as these have given 
thousands and thousands of dollars to the party to whom they are presumably opposed.  
While some of this might be explained by the targeting of favorable individual cross-
party candidates (as discussed supra), it’s still likely that both the NRA and the ATLA 
have engaged in bet-hedging to some degree.  Practically speaking, any non-zero amount 
given to competing candidates or party committees appears to strain the democratic 
preferences argument and raise questions of possible bet-hedging.  Whether more 
extreme splits in donations indicate a smaller likelihood that the donor is engaging in ex 
post favor-seeking – whether, that is, the United Auto Workers giving 1 percent of its 
total contribution to the Republicans is less indicative of bet-hedging than Citigroup, Inc. 
giving 47 percent to one and 53 percent to the other,129 since UAW is presumably tied 
ideologically to the Democrats far more than is Citigroup – is a question raised in Part 
IV.  Because the likelihood of bet-hedging is more stark where contributions to both sides 
are equal or nearly equal, this section focuses on instances where a donor indicates no 
strong preference for giving its money to one party over the other.
To that end, the CRP data also show that 34 of the top 100 donors over these 
seven election cycles gave at least 40 percent of their total contribution to each party.130
This roster includes giants from the telecommunications, banking, technology, trade, and 
insurance sectors, among others.131  The full slate of 34 top donors who, since the 1989 
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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election cycle, have cumulatively given at least 40 percent of their donations to each 
major party is as follows (in order of their appearance on the Top 100 Donors list):132
Top Donors Giving At Least 40 Percent to Each Party, 1989-2002
Name (Rank) Split Party receiving majority 
Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors (3) 53-47  Republican (R)
American Medical Ass’n (8) 59-41 (R) 
AT&T (12) 54-46 (R) 
Citigroup, Inc. (18) 53-47 (R) 
American Bankers Ass’n (27) 58-42 (R) 
FedEx Corp (28) 57-43 (R) 
BellSouth Corp. (29) 54-47 (R) 
SBC Communications (30) 56-44 (R) 
Ernst & Young (34) 53-46 (R) 
Lockheed Martin (35) 58-42 (R) 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. (36) 59-41 (R) 
Nat’l Ass’n of Insur. & Financial Adv. (38) 57-43 (R) 
American Institute of CPAs (39) 56-45 (R) 
Microsoft Corp (40) 57-43 (R) 
American Dental Ass’n (42) 53-47 (R) 
Bank of America (45) 54-46 (R) 
American Hospital Ass’n (46) 54-46 Democrat (D) 
General Electric (50) 52-48 (R) 
Morgan Stanley (51) 57-43 (R) 
AFLAC, Inc. (52) 55-46 (R) 
Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n (59) 52-48 (R) 
WorldCom, Inc. (64) 54-46 (R) 
Boeing Co. (65) 57-43 (R) 
Prudential Financial (68) 53-47 (R)
Freddie Mac (69) 59-41 (R)
Archer Daniels Midland (75) 57-43 (R)
Anheuser-Busch (78) 50-50
American Int’l Group (80) 54-46 (R)
132 Id.  It’s worth noting here that of those donors that gave at least 40 percent of their contributions to each 
party over this period, the overwhelming majority gave more to the Republicans than the Democrats (and 
only one, Anheuser-Busch, gave approximately equal amounts to both), although the reasons that this 
might be so are better explored in another paper.  And despite this tilt toward the Republicans in donations 
to both parties, the top 100 donors in toto gave significantly more money to the Democrats than the 
Republicans – 60 percent to 40 percent from 1989-2002.  Id.  This is attributable in large part to the number 
of labor unions on the top donors list, as more than 90 percent of the unions’ money goes to the Democrats.  
Still, the the gap between Democratic and Republican contributions on the top donor list has lessened over 
the past decade – from 71 percent Democratic and 29 percent Republican in 1990 to 57 percent Democratic 
and 43 percent Republican in 2002.  Shifting Strategies, supra note 107. 
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Nat’l Rural Electric Cooperative Ass’n (81) 57-43 (D)
American Academy of Ophthalmology (85) 56-44 (D)
General Dynamics (91) 55-45 (R)
American Airlines (93) 52-48 (R)
Metropolitan Life (96) 56-44 (D)
American Maritime Officers (97) 55-45 (R)
The CRP data, then, confirm at least initially the perception of many 
commentators: that over the last seven election cycles from 1989 to 2002, top donors
have given millions of dollars to each party.  This by itself is some evidence that these 
donors are hedging their bets, as it’s fairly unlikely that all 34 donors underwent 
philosophical shifts mid-decade causing them to switch their party allegiances.  Bearing 
in mind the possibility of gradual shifts, though, let’s see whether the data from the 2003-
2004 cycle look any different:133
Top Donors Giving At Least 40 Percent to Each Party, 2003-04
Name (2003-04 Rank) Split Party receiving majority
National Ass’n of Realtors (2) 52-48 Republicans (R)
Morgan Stanley (5) 59-41 (R)
JP Morgan Chase & Co. (7) 53-48 Democrats (D)
Citigroup, Inc. (8) 51-49 (D)
Bank of America (10) 53-47 (R)
General Electric (21) 53-47 (R)
Credit Union National Ass’n (26) 57-42 (R)
American Hospital Ass’n (33) 55-45 (R)
Credit Suisse First Boston (36) 54-46 (R)
Cendant Corp (49) 56-44 (R)
American Dental Ass’n (53) 60-40 (R)
Boeing Co. (59) 54-46 (R)
Bear Stearns (63) 50-50
WPP Group (66) 56-44 (D)
National Rural Electric Coop. Ass’n (67) 56-44 (R)
BellSouth Corp (71) 60-40 (R)
General Dynamics (76) 57-43 (R)
Comcast Corp (84) 52-48 (D)
133
 Top Donors 2003-2004, supra note 85.
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Anheuser-Busch (85) 60-40 (R)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Assn (90) 57-43 (R)
News Corp (97) 60-40 (D)
As this shows, 21 top donors have given at least 40 percent to each party in 2003-
04, compared with 34 from 1989-2002.134  The data demonstrate that top donors have 
essentially mirrored their aggregate giving practices on a cycle-by- cycle basis over the 
past fourteen years.135  Anheuser-Busch, for example, has given no less than 34 percent 
of its donations to each major party in every election cycle, although its contribution 
trend is toward more money to the Republicans and less to the Democrats – a 66-34 split 
in favor of the Democrats in 1989-90, 51-49 in favor of the Republicans for Election 
2000, and 60-40 in favor of the Republicans so far in 2003-04.136  Most of the donors 
listed above follow this same trend, shifting the bulk of their money from the Democrats 
to the Republicans while hovering near the 40 percent threshold every cycle for each 
party.
As mentioned earlier, this overall shift of monies to the Republican Party is most 
likely largely attributable to control of Congress changing hands in the mid-1990s.137
However, to the degree that these contributions are made to the national party committee 
rather than individual candidates, this shift in donations might also signal changes in 
fundraising strategy between the two parties or, indeed, changing party policies such that 
134 Id.
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 The Center for Responsive Politics, Blue Chip Investors: The Top 100 Donors to Federal Elections, 
1989-2002, “Donor Profiles,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/list.asp?order=A [hereinafter 
“Donor Profiles”].  FedEx Corp, supra note 103, is the notable exception.
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 The Center for Responsive Politics, Blue Chip Investors: The Top 100 Donors to Federal Elections, 
1989-2002, “Anheuser Busch,” available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.asp?ID=D000000144 [hereinafter “Anheuser Busch”].
137 See Shifting Strategies, supra note 107; E-mail from Robert Bauer, Chair, Political Law Group, Perkins 
Coie LLP, to author (March 10, 2003, 07:43 EST) (“What you might see, is a tilt in one direction or 
another, corresponding with the shift in majority status in the relevant institution.”) (on file with author).
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these donors – while still motivated to give to both parties – feel their interests better 
represented by the Republicans.  Additionally, although the sample size is small, it’s 
notable that the 2003-04 election cycle seems to have brought about a relative resurgence 
in top donors giving more to the Democrats than to the Republicans.  Of those donors 
who have given at least 40 percent to each party, 5 of 21 in 2003-04 made the bulk of 
their contributions to the Democrats, compared with only 2 of 24 in 2001-02.138  This 
might be explained by the inherent lability of the top donors list; donors crack the top 100 
one cycle and miss it the next, but their own donation practices stay relatively stable.  
Nevertheless, some organizations appear to have broken into the top 100 list in this cycle 
only because they have ramped up their giving to the Democrats, both as an absolute and 
a proportional matter.  Law firm Akin Gump Strauss gave 84 percent of its $240,000 in 
soft money campaign contributions to the Republicans in 1999-2000.139  In the 2002 
election cycle, the firm contributed 65 percent of its $218,000 in soft money to the 
Republicans.140  And in the 2004 election cycle Akin Gump gave 63 percent of its $1.2 
million in contributions to the Democrats.141
Furthermore, while top donors have shifted their contributions, proportionally, 
from Democrats to Republicans over the past decade, there is evidence that Democrats 
have made up ground in general with bet-hedging business donors.142  This has become 
enough of an issue in recent years that the Republicans, in response to the Democratic 
threat, have taken measures to divert the flow of dollars.  For example, the Republican 
138
 Top Donors 2001-2002, supra note 85.
139
 The Center for Responsive Politics, at http://www.opensecrets.org/softmoney/softcomp1.asp?
txtName=akin (last visited August 15, 2005) [Hereinafter “Akin Gump”].
140 Id.
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 Top Donors 2003-2004, supra note 85. 
142 See Glasser & Eilperin, supra note 56, at A6; Clymer, supra note 66, at A30 (both noting increased 
giving by businesses to Democrats).
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National Campaign Committee instituted the “75 Percent Club” explicitly to counter bet-
hedging by business; the club gives “special access to political action committees that 
give at least [75 percent] of their donations to GOP candidates.”143
It’s also interesting to observe that those donors who split their contributions most 
evenly between the major parties typically are not clumped at the top of the donor lists 
for each election cycle, but rather are scattered throughout the top 100 donors.  For the 
2003-2004 election cycle, for example, eleven of the twenty-one top donors giving at
least 40 percent to each party appeared in the bottom half of the list.144  Again, the 
numbers are rough, but it would seem at least intuitively that a donor would spend more 
money in giving equally to two parties than it would in making the bulk of its 
contribution to one side or the other.  That is, assume a donor has an amount $x in mind 
below which it believes its contribution will not have the desired effect, whether that 
effect is access, recognition, or something else, and an amount $y that is the maximum it 
is willing to donate.  Further assume that the donor believes that there exists an amount 
$z past which an increased donation will yield diminishing returns as to the effect 
desired, whatever that may be.  The amount a donor gives to one party will be no lower 
than the threshold $x and no higher than the ceiling $y, and, it seems logical, as close to 
maximization point $z as the donor is able accurately to assess.  Thus, a rational donor 
giving to two parties should be giving at least twice $x, and optimally twice $z.  Yet, 
from the data, top donors giving in near-equal proportions to both major parties appear to 
have a significantly lower valuation of $x and/or $z than do donors directing their giving 
largely to a single party.  Or perhaps single-party donors, tending to be less pragmatic 
143
 Allen, supra note 92, at A11; see also Keller, supra note 71 (quoting a Republican congressman that 
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and more issue-oriented, are less apt to be concerned with the value of $z and more likely 
to approach the ceiling amount $y when contributing, even in the face of diminished 
returns.145
The CRP data definitively show that many top donors gave a sizeable proportion 
of their money to both Democrats and Republicans in the 2003-04 election cycle.  They 
also show that almost every top donor has given some money to both parties.  Of the top 
100 donors, only 2 gave 100 percent of their money to a single political party:146
Top Donors’ Donation Split Between Parties, 2003-04
Between 50-50 and 60-40 percent split: 23 donors (23)
Between 61-39 and 70-30: 29 donors (29)
Between 71-29 and 80-20: 13 donors (13)
Between 81-19 and 90-10: 13 donors (13)
Between 91-9 and 99-1: 20 donors (20)
100-0 split: 2 donors (2)
While such an overwhelmingly high incidence of cross-party giving is certainly 
suggestive of a good deal of bet-hedging, it isn’t conclusive; per the discussion of 
donation-splitting in Part III.A, we still do not know enough about these donors’ behavior 
to confidently infer ex post favor-seeking.  The percentages calculated by CRP are “based 
on contributions from PACs, soft money donors and individuals giving $200 or more to 
federal candidates, parties and leadership PACs, as reported to the Federal Election 
144
 Top Donors 2003-2004, supra note 85.
145 See Part IV.B, infra.
146
 Top Donors 2003-2004, supra note 85.  The top donors giving 100 percent to one of the major parties 
and 0 percent to the other are EMILY’s List (6) and Simmons Cooper LLC (94), both donating all of their 
money to the Democrats.  Id.  The Club for Growth (75) is listed as having given 99 percent of its 
contributions to the Republicans and 0 percent to the Democrats in 2003-2004, and the United Food & 
Commercial Workers (47) gave 100 percent to the Democrats and 1 percent to the Republicans.  For both 
these donors, it appears that some donation-splitting took place, however miniscule.
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Commission.”147  Although the data for total contributions are further broken down by 
the method of donation (PAC, individual, or, where applicable, soft money), the data for 
the recipient of the donation, whether party or candidate, is not broken down at all. That 
is, the numbers compiled show that AT&T gave 53 percent, or $1.6 million, of its $3 
million in 2001-2002 contributions to Republicans and 47 percent, or $1.4 million to 
Democrats.148  They also show that 73 percent of that money came from soft money 
contributions, 20 percent from PACs, and 7 percent from individuals.149  But there is no 
way to tell from this data how much of the $1.6 million given to Republicans came from 
PACs versus soft money, or how much went to the Republican National Committee and 
how much went to individual candidates.
Absent more detailed data, then, the premise of this paper that bet-hedging is 
more than an incidental occurrence must largely be assumed.  However, given the 
extensive anecdotal reports in which donors are quoted indicating that they are hedging 
their bets,150 and the suggestiveness of the CRP data (in which many, many top donors 
give a substantial portion of their contribution to both parties), it seems to be a safe 
assumption to make.
147
 Top Donors 1989-2002, supra note 85.
148
 The Center for Responsive Politics,  “AT&T,” available at 
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.asp?ID=D000000063 [hereinafter “AT&T”] (last visited August 
15, 2005).
149 Id.
150 See, e.g., Glasser & Eilperin, supra note 56, at A6 (quoting lobbyist, “We better make sure our interests 
are protected no matter who’s in control.”); Ayres, supra note 59, at A16 (quoting lobbyist, “If you didn’t 
give, you’d probably alienate both of them.”); Allen, supra note 92, at A11 (quoting SBC spokesperson, 
“There are people in both parties who support competitive telecommunications markets, which is what we 
support, so we give to candidates of both parties and both party committees.”).
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IV. Why, How, and When: Questions About Bet-Hedging
Having ascertained that bet-hedging does occur and is likely fairly prevalent, this 
paper now explores the details of bet-hedging strategy.  Specifically, it asks three 
questions: 1) Why do donors hedge their bets?  What are they seeking in return that 
justifies the cost of giving?  2) How do donors hedge their bets?  What is the optimal 
apportionment of donation dollars?  3) When do donors hedge their bets?  What 
conditions trigger a decision to hedge or not to hedge?  And does it matter if the parties or 
candidates know that the donor is spreading its money around?
Because of the dearth of analysis on the subject, this paper is less concerned with 
answering all the questions it raises regarding bet-hedging than with raising them in the 
first place.  Each of the questions asked in this section might plausibly be the subject of a 
separate, detailed examination; for now, however, I am content to touch upon each issue 
and leave it alone.  In gauging the appropriateness of a regulatory response, all that needs 
be known about bet-hedging is that it is a rational strategy, that it leads to donor 
expectation of ex post benefits, and that it is likely to persist absent regulation.
A. Why Do Donors Hedge Their Bets?
First principles first: why do donors give money at all?  If, like votes, political 
contributions are meant, first, to express a democratic preference for one candidate or 
platform over competing alternatives and, second, to influence events in favor of that 
candidate or platform, then bet-hedging fails on both fronts.  By giving to competing 
candidates or parties, a donor is neither expressing a preference for one over the other nor 
attempting to effect a particular electoral outcome, just as someone who votes for two 
opposing candidates is canceling her own vote, expressing no preference, and doing 
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nothing to help either candidate win.151  Thus hedged-bet donations, like hedged-bet 
votes, cannot rationally be justified as advancing a citizen’s personal (or, as is most often 
the case, institutional) democratic interests.152
This is true even if the amounts given to each side are not equivalent.  As 
discussed earlier,153 if more money is given to one side than the other, then only the 
difference between the contributions matters in the end.  That is, if $x is given to 
Candidate A and $x+y is given to competing Candidate B, only the donor’s contribution 
of $y to Candidate B matters.  Therefore, if Donor Z gives $40,000 to the Arkansas 
Democratic Party and $60,000 to the Arkansas Republican Party in a nonfederal 
election,154 only the $20,000 difference between the contributions matters in effecting a 
preference for one over the other.  If Donor Z’s sole intent is to demonstrate its 
preference between the two candidates, there is no reason not to give $20,000 to the 
Republicans and be done with it.
It may be that Donor Z wishes to give unequal amounts to each side in order to 
signal the intensity of its preference.  That is, perhaps it is not the absolute value of each 
contribution that matters, but rather their value relative to one another.  In this way, 
assuming perfect information, the RNC would know that Donor Z valued them $20,000 
151 See Keller, supra note 71 (quoting a PAC fundraiser criticizing the bet-hedging strategy and saying that 
“if a PAC sees no significant difference between the two candidates . . . the better decision is to sit it out 
and help the winner after the election.”).
152
 More so because donating twice, unlike voting twice, requires an expenditure of money.  To vote for 
competing candidates would be, if legal, a costless enterprise easily to be undertaken in a fit of whimsy.  
The lack of result is mitigated by the lack of outlay.  Assuming some modicum of economic rationality, it 
simply makes no sense for an institutional donor to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars neutralizing its 
own contributions, expressing no net preference, and ultimately failing to influence the result of the 
election.  There is an argument that donating to competing candidates is beneficial to our democratic 
system in a way that voting for competing candidates is not, as giving money to both sides allows greater 
amounts of political speech and a more informed, more empowered citizenry. This rationale for, or effect 
of, bet-hedging is explored infra.     
153 See note 18, supra.
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greater than their opponents.  This possibility is revisited in Part IV.C, infra, but for now 
it is enough to say that this motivation, too, fails under the democratic preferences 
rationale.  If Donor Z does not care about securing a favorable ex post position for itself, 
but wishes only to advance the prospects of its preferred party, then it shouldn’t matter 
whether or not that party knows how much more Donor Z likes them than the 
alternatives.
Assuming that Donor Z is a rational actor, the most plausible explanation for its 
donating to competing candidates or parties is that it expects to receive ex post benefits 
from the eventual winner.  Just as voting for competing candidates is rational if everyone 
who votes for the winning candidate is rewarded after the election, so too is bet- hedging 
rational if a donor believes that it will be rewarded by giving to the winning side.  This is 
the crucial feature of bet-hedging that makes it more suspect, and more susceptible to 
regulation, than regular donor behavior under the Buckley and McConnell frameworks: if 
a donor hedges its bets, it is presumptively engaging in a quid pro quo transaction –
contributions now, benefits later.155
If a donor rationally believes that it will receive some desired benefit from either 
side after the election, it logically follows that the two sides are ideologically consonant 
to some degree on issues that are important to that donor.  In other words, it would make 
no sense for a bet-hedging donor to contribute money to a candidate if it did not believe 
that that candidate, having won the election, would (and could) reward the donor for its 
contribution.  Let’s say Donor Z desires ex post influence in prohibiting the importation 
154
 Arkansas is one of the states allowing unlimited contributions to state party committees in state 
elections.  See State Party Contribution Limits, supra note 9.
155
 That these benefits may come in the form of increased access, which by itself is arguably insufficiently 
troublesome to sustain regulation of political speech, is a possibility examined in Part V, infra.
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of under-priced widgets.  It knows that Mr. Dem will provide that influence to his donors 
in the event that he wins the election, while Mrs. Gop, if she wins, will not.   In this case, 
bet-hedging is not a rational strategy for Donor Z.  It is better off conserving its resources 
or giving the whole of its money to Mr. Dem.
So a bet-hedging donor expects to receive ex post benefits from whichever 
candidate or party happens to gain control after the election.  What might these benefits 
entail?  For the purposes of this paper, the particular ex post motivation of a donor 
matters less than the fact that the ex post motivation exists at all; that one donor might be 
seeking influence while another donor fears retaliation from not contributing in no way 
implicates the normative value  or constitutional viability of bet-hedging.  (The one 
potential exception to this statement are donations made for the purposes of increased 
access.  This problem is examined in Part V.)  It is interesting, however, to note the many 
and varied explanations that have been given for hedged-bet behavior.  These are quickly 
summarized here.
It should first be observed that even in the case of donations to competing 
candidates, many donors will disavow the notion that anything specific is expected in 
return.  A spokesperson for telecommunications giant SBC, for example, offered this 
explanation for his company’s split donations: “There are people in both parties who 
support competitive telecommunications markets, which is what we support, so we give 
to candidates of both parties and both party committees.”156  In justifying giving to both 
party committees, this rationale fails to convince: along the lines of the discussion in Part 
III.A, even if both parties propound favorable policies to SBC, there is no reason that it 
156
 Allen, supra note 92, at A11 (emphasis added).
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should give to both.  Better in that case to save money for individual races in which 
certain candidates favor SBC’s policy goals more than their competitors.
Other reasons given for hedged-bet donations that do not involve ex post favor-
seeking include neutrality/impartiality157 or a belief in the personal merits of each 
candidate, 158 the reflection of a donor’s diverse membership,159 and the generalized 
advancement of democracy.160  The first of these reasons largely begs the question; there 
is no need to try and appear impartial or neutral unless the contributor seeks favorable 
treatment from the eventual winner.  In the words of a Connecticut Republican state party 
official, “If someone is giving the same amount of funds, it’s obvious they are not hurt in 
either way by the election of one candidate. . . .  They do that to show that it’s not a 
personal issue.”161  But if it is true that the donor is “not hurt in either way,” to what end 
does it profit by signaling its impartiality to the candidates?  The most logical answer, if 
that is indeed the donor’s aim, is that the donor is seeking individualized ex post benefits. 
Of course, the appearance of neutrality could be directed elsewhere than at the 
political actors themselves.  A corporation might wish to cultivate a public perception of 
its evenhandedness and civic virtue.162  If this is so, however, there would seem to be 
157 See, e.g., Torry, supra note 69, at F7 (a law firm known to be Democratic gives to Republicans in “a 
conscious effort to be bipartisan”).
158 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 61, at B1 (“Some donors said competing contributions are merely a sign 
that both Kallinger and Segal are qualified for the job. ‘They're both great guys,’ said Allan Keen, chairman 
of the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority. Both Keen and his business, The Keewin Real 
Property Company, have written $500 checks to Kallinger and Segal. ‘It's not often that you have two 
really outstanding candidates.’”).
159 See, e.g., Shear & Eggen, supra note 77, at C1 (CapNet, a technology PAC, feels the need to represent 
the interests of each of its members). 
160 See, e.g., Charles R. Babcock, Paying Dearly to Be Top Fans of a Winning Team; 8 Contributors Gave 
At Least $100,000 to Both Major Parties During ’88 Campaign, WASHINGTON POST, February 1, 1989, at 
A10 (donor gave $100,000 to both Bush and Dukakis because they each “needed more opportunity to be 
heard”).
161
 Griffin, supra note 58, at 1.
162
 For an international example, see Jack Ewing, Hard Politics, Soft Money, BUSINESS WEEK, August 8, 
2005, at 86 (“Allianz, a Munich-based insurance and banking colossus, gives exactly 50,001 euros to each 
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cheaper or more effective ways to achieve this aim than to donate to competing 
candidates or parties.  Neutrality is handily communicated by not putting any money into 
politics whatsoever; giving to no one runs less risk of public cynicism about the donor’s 
motivations than giving to everyone.  In the same way, if a potential donor is “so 
impressed with both candidates after a round of interviews and questionnaires that they 
[can’t] decide whom to support,” why not breathe easily, secure in the knowledge that the 
electoral outcome will be favorable, and save some cash?163  All of which is not to say 
that some donors do not give to opposing sides for exactly these reasons, merely that it 
strains credibility to believe that most, or even many, of the donors who split their 
donations are doing so in order to make others think that they are studiously apolitical or 
to express their appreciation for such a solid field of candidates.
Similarly, it is perfectly plausible that some institutional donors give to both sides 
in order most fully to represent the diversity of political views held by their members, 
employees, or shareholders.164  But this rationale is rarely invoked by donors engaging in 
apparent bet-hedging, does not account for individuals who give to competing political 
actors, and is generally an unsatisfying rationale for the sheer prevalence of hedged-bet 
donations within our political system.
of the five political parties represented in Germany's Bundestag. Both the donations and the fact that 
Allianz gives just enough to require full disclosure are ‘an expression of our civic duty,’ says Nicolai 
Tewes, the company's director of corporate relations.”).
163
 Garcia, supra note 61, at B1 (“Kay Behrens, chairwoman of the West Orange Political Alliance, said the 
group's 17 members were so impressed with both candidates after a round of interviews and questionnaires 
that they couldn't decide whom to support. So they gave each $500. ‘We got down to these two guys, went 
back and forth, and just felt they were both strong candidates,’ Behrens said. ‘It's not hedging bets at all.’”).
164
 Kent Cooper of Public Disclosure, Inc., agrees that this rationale is in play for certain donors:  “You 
have more PACs that are listening to their employees, and in many cases that's the safest thing for a PAC to 
do so they represent their donor base.”  Keller, supra note 71.  See also Andrews, supra note 73, at 1A 
(“Among the biggest contributors to both campaigns was the law firm Baker & Daniels, which records 
show gave $ 103,460 to Daniels and $ 90,550 to Kernan. Baker & Daniels Chairman Brian Burke said the 
bipartisanship reflects the differing political views of the lawyers who work at the firm as well as its roots. 
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The argument that hedged-bet donors, by giving to both sides, advance and secure 
the stability of representative democracy and the vitality of a two-party system – that they 
are “civic patriots”165 – deserves a little more attention.  This is an especially potent 
defense of split giving because the actual effects of the practice are just as important as 
the motivation of the donors.  If donors are giving solely in order to support the American 
political process or to be good citizens, then they are not looking for specific ex post
favors or benefits, and they are not hedging their bets.166  But even if donors are bet-
hedging, they might be helping to sustain a healthy political system whether they mean to 
or not.  If the result of donation-splitting is positive overall, then perhaps this sort of 
donor behavior should not be targeted for regulation.167
Nevertheless, the evidence again suggests that even if some donors are 
contributing with the innocuous (and even laudable) goal of making sure that parties and 
candidates have the resources to disseminate their message,168 much apparent bet-
hedging behavior cannot be characterized in this fashion.  Even where donors claim the 
advancement of democracy as their motivation, such an explanation often seems overly 
One of its founding partners served as a Republican governor and another served as a Democratic 
governor.”).
165
 Slackman, supra note 26 (quoting Steven Weissman, associate director of policy at the Campaign 
Finance Institute, as saying that “[h]istorically, double givers are often people seeking access to both 
parties, rather than civic patriots.”).
166 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 73, at 1A (Indianapolis Colts owner Jim Irsay explaining his giving to 
both Indiana gubernatorial candidates by saying, “I think of my participation as supporting the system,
rather than individual candidates, especially when the opponents are equally qualified, as in this year's 
gubernatorial race.”).
167
 This objection to a regulatory response to bet-hedging is considered further in Part V.
168 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 58, at 1 (quoting a bet-hedging donor that “[i]t takes money to get the word 
out.  I’m sympathetic to the needs of the candidates.”); Friedman, supra note 75, at 13 (quoting a New 
York real estate developer who donated the maximum allowable contribution to all mayoral candidates but 
one because “they’re all excellent candidates, and . . . they all deserve the opportunity to present their 
views.”); Garcia, supra note 61, at B1 (“‘We're involved in the community, and we want to make sure that 
they have the wherewithal to at least get their message out,’ said Orlando Evora, a co-managing partner in 
the Orlando office of the Greenberg Traurig law firm, which has also contributed the maximum to both 
candidates.”).
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pat and incomplete.  As an example, take the Florida law firm that donated money, 
through several PACs, to four Miami-Dade mayoral candidates in 2004 (one of these four 
returned the donation).169  As quoted in the Miami Herald, the founder of the firm 
explained his support of multiple mayoral campaigns by saying that there are “five good, 
strong, qualified candidates” in the election.170  This response raises two reasonable 
questions.  First, if all five candidates are good, strong, and qualified, why is the firm 
only donating to four?  The article proffers a legitimate explanation for this, reporting 
that the law firm’s checks were disbursed before the fifth candidate entered the race.171
Second, if the firm would, as it appears on the strength of its words, be happy with all of 
the candidates as the next Miami-Dade mayor, why give to any at all?  The general 
inference that a donor must be seeking ex post benefits when it gives to competing 
candidates can only be strengthened by the knowledge that the donor would find any of 
the available field of candidates an acceptable victor. This admittedly sidesteps the 
advancement of democracy rationale, which does carry some strength.  But it suggests 
that, under a system in which public disclosure is valued and candidates easily can 
discover the source of their funds, it is often very difficult to separate an advancement of 
democracy in which recognition of giving is an incidental effect from a desire to be 
recognized by all candidates, whereby democracy just happens to be advanced.172
Elections in which candidates identify themselves as representatives of a 
particular political party, as is the case in most state and federal races, highlight a 
169
 Noah Bierman, Law Firm Multiplies its Support, THE MIAMI HERALD, August 4, 2004, at B8.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172
 As will be discussed in Part V, this is one of the reasons that regulation of bet-hedging might be more 
feasible or more desirable in a framework of anonymous giving like that proposed by Ian Ayres and Jeremy 
Bulow, supra note 53, than in our current campaign finance system.
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different vulnerability of the civic patriotism explanation.  Bet-hedging behavior is 
directed almost uniformly at the two major parties.173  In the interests of promoting 
political speech and sustaining democratic choice, it would make sense for at least some 
donors who split their contributions to give money to the parties or candidates that most 
demonstrably need it: those with no appreciable current voice in the American political 
system.  Yet candidates with little chance of winning an election receive, by and large, no 
financial support from those donors that are happily supplementing the campaign coffers 
of the well-financed, front-running campaigns.  Dennis Kucinich, for example, collected 
precious few donations for his failed 2004 presidential run from donors who had given to 
Bush and Kerry.174   Ralph Nader’s top contributors over the past fourteen years bear 
almost no relationship to those of the major-party presidential candidates.175  Surely 
financial support has great marginal utility to the campaigns of Kucinich and Nader; what 
better way to foster democracy than by funding those messages that are least heard?  To 
the extent that a bet-hedging donor does not give to these candidates solely because they 
stand no shot of victory, the advancement of democracy argument sounds a flat note.  In 
the case of Nader, at least, it may be that donors direct their monies to Democrats and 
Republicans because they prefer the political stability of a two-party system.  There are 
compelling normative arguments for having only two strong political parties. Such a 
173 See, e.g., Top Donors 1989-2002, supra note 85 (money given by the top 100 donors is split nearly 
exclusively between the Democrats and Republicans). 
174
 The Center for Responsive Politics, “Dennis Kucinich: Top Contributors, 2004 Cycle,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/contrib.asp?id=N00003572&cycle=2004 (last visited August 8, 
2004) [hereinafter “Kucinich Contributors 2004”].  Those contributors that did give money to Bush, Kerry, 
and Kucinich, like Microsoft, Boeing, and Viacom, gave far less to Kucinich than to the other two 
candidates, a counterintuitive result for the advancement of democracy rationale.  Id.
175
 The Center for Responsive Politics, “Ralph Nader: Top Contributors, All Cycles,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/contrib.asp?ID=N00000086&Cycle=All (last visited August 8, 
2004) [hereinafter “Nader Contributors 1990-2004”].
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preference is perfectly valid.176  But the two-party system is in scant need of protection or 
support; whether or not donors who give only to the Democrats and Republicans intend 
their money to safeguard these institutions from encroachment by competitors, it 
arguably has no appreciable effect in that regard.177  Richard Hasen notes that “[t]he two-
party system in the United States may be at its strongest point in history.”178  There is 
little evident danger that the Democratic Party would cease to be an effective foil for the 
Republicans (or vice-versa) if donors were required to choose no more than one 
candidate from either of these parties to support in a given race.179
One point potentially in favor of the civic patriotism argument is donor behavior 
with regard to 527 groups.  Such groups, as discussed in Part II.A, infra, exist in large 
part specifically in order to increase political speech, whether by voter mobilization, get 
out the vote efforts, or advertisements touting particular issues.  Moreover, the 
electioneering in which 527s engage cannot include express advocacy of a candidate, or 
else the groups become subject to federal contribution limits under FECA.180  It is true 
that the line between the sort of electioneering that subjects a 527 to FECA’s limits and 
the sort that does not is often quite blurred.181  Nevertheless, contributions to 527 groups 
serve to advance democracy (by mobilizing, registering, and educating voters) at least as 
176
 And the Supreme Court, for one, agrees.  See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 
351 (1997) (state interest in political stability justifies discrimination in favor of two-party system).
177 See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to 
Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 367-71 
(1997). 
178 Id. at 370.
179
 Of course, the actual consequences of regulating bet-hedging are largely unknowable, and the costs of 
such regulation may, in the end, outweigh the benefits.  It may be that some bet-hedging donors, forced to 
choose, will opt out of the system entirely to avoid explicit affiliation with a party or candidate.  The 
potential impact of this is discussed in Part V. 
180 See Holman & Claybrook, supra note 6, at 245-48.
181 See, e.g., Potter, supra note 6, at 1135 (“As is now manifestly clear, the "bright line" express advocacy
test adopted by the Supreme Court in Buckley to implement the expenditure restriction and disclosure 
system created by Congress has proven to be grossly inadequate in reaching campaign spending.”).
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well as, and possibly better than, contributions to party committees or to candidates.  
Donors wishing to be civic patriots are free to give unlimited amounts of money to 
increase the political speech of 527 groups and help inform and energize the public; 
contributions to candidates and parties, even if similarly motivated by civic goodwill, are 
restricted by federal law.  
One might expect, then, if civic patriotism drives donors to contribute to 
competing parties, to see those same donors also give to 527 groups, where much more 
money can be spent increasing political speech without having to throw support behind a 
particular political party (or, as it happens, parties).  One might also see individuals and 
organizations giving to multiple and competing 527s, if facilitation of the medium is truly 
more important than endorsement of the message.  In fact, it’s a mixed bag: many top 
donors to competing parties and candidates tend also to donate to 527 groups, and to 
engage in bet-hedging behavior while they do; Boeing, for example, has given money 
both to Americans for a Republican Majority182 and to the New Democrat Network.183
Conversely, however, top donors to 527 groups are generally ideologically consistent 
182
 The Center for Responsive Politics, Boeing Co: Expenditures, 2003-2004,” available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/expend.asp?strID=C00142711&Cycle=2004 (last visited August 14, 
2005).
183
 The Center for Responsive Politics, “New Democrat Network: Top Contributors, 2004 Cycle,” available 
at http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail.asp?ein=521981307&cycle=2004&format=&tname
=New+Democrat+Network (last visited August 14, 2005).  The New Democrat Network, however, is a 
centrist organization tending “to hold liberal positions on social issues and conservative positions on 
economic and foreign policy issues.”  The Center for Responsive Politics, “New Democrat Network, 2004 
Election Cycle,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527events.asp?orgid=13 (last visited August 
14, 2005).  Boeing does not give money to other, more liberal PACs like Moveon.org; to the extent that the 
economic policies of the New Democrat Network are ideologically consonant with those of Boeing, then, a 
pure civic patriotism explanation looks less likely.  Of course, this means that Boeing could very well be 
giving according to its political preferences and, with regard to the New Democrat Network at least, not
bet-hedging at all.
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regarding the sorts of groups to which they donate, and do not hedge their bets.184  It is 
true that 527s themselves are often quite partisan in their commitment to single issues or 
ideologies – EMILY’s List and the Club for Growth being illustrative examples. 
However, from a disinterested, civic patriot standpoint, giving to opposing 527s would 
presumably have a similar net positive effect on the political system as giving to 
opposing parties or candidates.185  Definitive answers on donor behavior toward 527s 
cannot be had until the dust has settled following BCRA; for now, it is enough to say that 
donors who split their donations both to competing candidates and parties and to 
ideologically inapposite 527s might more plausibly attribute their pattern of giving to 
civic patriotism and generalized advancement of democracy than those donors who give 
to competing candidates and parties but who give only to one sort of 527 group, or who 
eschew giving to 527s altogether.186
Back to the form that ex post benefits for bet-hedging might take.  First and most 
basic is the expectation that the donor will receive something positive and individualized 
from the winner.  This might take the form of specific ex post influence, special access, 
or general relationship-building.  See, for example, the Republican Party’s Team 100, 
which conferred benefits upon donors giving more than $100,000.187
184
 The Center for Responsive Politics, “527 Committee Activity: Top 50 Committees,” available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp?level=C&cycle=2004 (last visited August 14, 2005) 
[hereinafter “Top 527s”].  
185
 The reluctance of top 527 donors to hedge their bets may also be explained by the fact that those who 
give the most money to 527s tend disproportionately to be individuals, foundations, or small business 
owners.  See, e.g., The Center for Responsive Politics, “Club for Growth: Top Contributors, 2004 Cycle,” 
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail.asp?ein=522155986&cycle=2004&format=
&tname=Club+for+Growth (last visited August 15, 2005).  As noted in Part III, supra, such donors 
generally split their donations between competitors far less than do larger businesses and organizations.
186
 This latter, of course, may simply be donor preference; a donor can legitimately wish only to give its 
money to political parties and candidates and still be motivated by civic patriotism.
187
 Babcock, supra note 160.
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Alternatively, some donors may contribute to both sides because they fear 
retaliation.  In the words of Bruce Cain, framing a frequent complaint of lobbyists, 
“legislators force groups to give money in order to maintain access to the legislator, or to 
keep the legislator from taking some threatened action (that is, so-called "tree-shaking" 
activities).”188  There is likely some basis for this view – according to a 2000 survey of 
300 corporate executives, “at least 51 percent…agreed that turning down requests for 
campaign contributions could bring retaliation in the form of adverse legislation.”189
Gerald Greenwald, former CEO of United Airlines, puts it plainly in a declaration made 
in connection with the McConnell litigation:
Business and labor leaders believe, based on their experience, that 
disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor 
them because they have not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if 
they refuse to contribute (enough), competing interests who do contribute 
generously will have an advantage in gaining access to and influencing 
key Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or 
union.190
 Although Greenwald’s statement applies to soft money generally without 
singling out bet-hedging, Bill Phelps, a lobbyist whose oil company contributed $5,000 to 
each candidate in the 1998 Texas lieutenant governor race, attributes his hedged-bet 
giving to a desire to avoid negative repercussions: “If you don’t give…you’d probably 
alienate both of them.”191  Whether or not these repercussions are real or imagined is 
essentially beside the point; if donors will give to both sides on the basis of perceived 
188
 Cain, supra note 42, at 124.
189
 Wolfe, supra note 80.
190
 Declaration of Gerald Greenwald, quoted in 124 S.Ct. at 649 n.13.  See generally Brief for Council of 
Economic Development et al. as Amici Curiae, 2002 U.S. Briefs 1674, 1679-89 (August 5, 2003).  The 
McConnell Court, summarizing the position of these amici on this issue, relate their attestation that 
“corporate soft-money contributions are coerced and, at bottom, wholly commercial in nature, and that 
business leaders increasingly wish to be freed from the grip of a system in which they fear the adverse 
consequences of refusing to pay the coffers of the major parties.”  124 S.Ct. at 649 n.13 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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benefits, it’s easy to imagine them doing so on in the interest of preventing perceived 
negative consequences.
Finally, donors might not seek anything tangible at all from their hedged-bet 
contributions, at least in the short term.  Some contributors might give to competing 
candidates in order to support a particular political characteristic that both candidates 
share, in the hope that each candidate, regardless whether he wins the election, will find 
future success within his own party.192  Others might be mindful of alienating candidates 
who have been helpful to them in the past.  In the 2004 South Dakota Senate race, 
Norfolk Southern Railroad contributed both to incumbent Tom Daschle and to then-
Representative John Thune.  A Norfolk Southern executive explained this double giving 
by saying that “Senator Daschle has been helpful to the railroad industry and his 
opponent has been helpful to the railroad industry, so you have two friends running 
against each other. . . .  I think they would prefer we give to both rather than not give at 
all.”193
Many donors claim to give to both sides out of personal friendship with the 
candidates194 or with those soliciting money for the candidates195 – or, in one case, out of 
191
 Ayres, supra note 59, at A16.
192 See David Ingram, Givers Divide Their Giving; Major donors in N.C. governor’s race made sure to help 
each side, WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, November 6, 2004, at B1 (Democratic donor gave money to GOP 
challenger because “[h]e’s the kind of Republican I’d like to see more of”).
193
 Christopher Dinsmore, Paying for Access, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (NORFOLK, VA.), October 3, 2004, at 
D1.
194 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 73, at 1A (law firm giving to competing gubernatorial candidates because 
of “long-standing personal relationships” with each); Anemona Hartocollis, Kerry's Other Band of 
Brothers, NEW YORK TIMES, February 29, 2004 (Yale alumnus giving to both Kerry and Bush because “I 
consider both of these fellas being my friends.”); GOP Donors Not Playing Favorites, supra note 67, at 14 
(“It’s a question of being there to support someone if you can.”).
195 See, e.g., Young, supra note 72, at 1B (“Sloan, a politically active Democrat who has organized 
numerous fund-raisers, said he contributed to Bush out of allegiance to a colleague who asked him to help 
out with an event. 'That's the nature of the fund-raising game, if you want to call it that,' Sloan said. 'There 
are occasions when people assist me when they are not overly enthusiastic.' Sloan gave $1,000 to Bush but 
$10,000 to Kerry. 'When it comes to writing out a check of that magnitude, I put my money where my 
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appreciation for a timely use of the Heimlich maneuver.196  The friendship rationale is 
particularly plausible in local races, where it is more likely that a hedged-bet giver would 
know each candidate personally and where the desire for continued amity would be 
strong.197  Similarly, donors might view the contributions as a precondition of “managing 
their relationships with political actors;”198 a cover charge, if you will.  In this regard, it’s 
important to remember that political contributions are not a one-time game – it may help 
three cycles down the line to have been a loyal and consistent contributor to a particular 
party, even if it nets the donor nothing right now.
One objection to the notion that donors can hedge their bets by contributing to 
party committees is that committees, unlike elected officials, cannot advance a donor’s 
interests in any concrete way.  The RNC serves on no Senate subcommittee, writes no 
bills, votes on nothing.  This is true, in its way, but it misses the larger picture: by 
establishing itself as a big-money Republican contributor, a donor gains access to the 
Republican policy process in a way that it would not if it were only contributing to 
individual candidates.  Contributing to parties, for example, allows donors the 
opportunity to underwrite party events,199 gaining valuable and broad-based 
acknowledgment as a friend of the cause.
convictions are,' he said.”); Babcock, supra note 160, at A10 (“[P]eople respond because they don’t want to 
say no to someone they know who solicits them.”).
196
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197 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 62 (“Asked about his support for both Hosterman and her opponent, Ayala, 
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 Bauer E-mail, supra note 137.
199 See, e.g., WorldCom’s underwriting of a party dinner, Marc J. Ambinder, Hedging Their Bets: 
WorldCom Directed Money to Both Democrats and Republicans, ABC NEWS, June 26, 2002, at
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Also, donating to parties effectively gives a contributor value on every dollar 
spent: if Donor Z gives money to competing candidates, only one of them will win.  
Donor Z’s additional outlay in contributing to the losing candidate must thus be recouped 
in the value of the ex post benefits derived from the winner.  By contrast, if Donor Z 
gives money to both party committees, it may gain access and influence with both parties, 
rather than just the one in control.
B. How Do Donors Hedge Their Bets?
How are donations split?  What is the decisional process?  Some sort of 
calculation must be made by the donor in deciding how much to give each side.  
Sometimes, as we’ve seen, donors apportion their money equally.  This seems the safest 
bet.  But when they do not – and most of the top donors seem to donate different amounts 
to each side – how do they figure out who gets what?
At base, the amount of a donor’s contribution – say, that of Donor Z – may simply 
be a function of how much they are asked to give.  If this is the case, then the differential 
amount given is not an indication that Donor Z values one side over the other – rather, 
one party or candidate has just solicited more money than their competitor.  Donor Z may 
use other external indicia in deciding how much it will give, as well.  If a $50,000 
donation to the Democrats confers the same benefits as a $75,000 to the Republicans, 
then, all else being equal, a bet-hedging donor is likely to give $25,000 less to the former 
than the latter.  A similar possibility is that Donor Z will give enough to each party or 
candidate as to pass the monetary threshold that triggers receipt of certain benefits – like 
http://www.abcnews.com.  And, post-BCRA, national party conventions are one of the only places where 
donors can contribute an unlimited amount to federal political actors.  See Part II, supra.
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the Republicans’ Team 100, mentioned earlier.200  Or Donor Z may gauge the giving 
behavior of those that have already contributed; giving in the same proportion as those 
whose expected benefits match Donor Z’s, or giving more to one party or candidate than 
those who Donor Z seeks to outstrip.
Let’s assume, however, that the decision to give $x to one candidate and $y to 
another is a purely internal calculation.  What might this calculation look like?  The 
perceived benefits of giving to both must be sufficiently preferable to the perceived 
benefits of giving to only one to justify the additional financial outlay.  Put another way, 
by giving to both sides, the donor is purchasing certainty.  If Donor Z knows that it will 
receive benefits from the winner no matter who the winner is, then it behooves Donor Z 
to contribute to both sides if the outcome of the race is uncertain.  The more uncertain the 
outcome, the more evenly Donor Z should spread its donations.
The distribution also depends on whether Donor Z has a fixed total sum that it is 
willing to contribute, or whether its total donation is dependent upon its calculation of the 
optimal split.  That is, if Donor Z’s ceiling amount of $y (see Part III.B, supra) is 
$50,000, then its preferred ex post position must be a) sufficiently certain and/or b) 
sufficiently desirable to justify splitting this $50,000 in order to maximize its chances of 
attaining that position.  An equal distribution of its donation, no matter how much it 
values the ex post position, must result in $25,000 to one candidate and $25,000 to the 
other if the outcome is uncertain (and up to $50,000 to one candidate if the outcome is 
certain).  If, on the other hand, Donor Z plans to spend at least $50,000 on one candidate 
– and up to $50,000 on the other candidate – to achieve certainty of ex post position, then 
that position must be sufficiently desirable to justify spending more than $50,000 in order 
200
 Babcock, supra note 160.
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to attain it.  In this case, an equal distribution of Donor Z’s total contribution could result 
in $50,000 going to each candidate (if the outcome is initially uncertain and Donor Z 
values certainty highly), or $50,000 going only to one candidate (if the outcome is 
initially certain and/or Donor Z does not value certainty very highly).
While the probability of each side’s success factors into the calculation, Donor Z 
must also take into account the marginal value of each donation.  This is true in two 
ways.  First, it may be that there is a threshold amount that a candidate must receive in 
order to ensure that Donor Z will receive its desired ex post benefits.  Let’s say that 
Donor Z knows that any contribution under $25,000 will not result in the desired ex post
benefits, even if the recipient of that contribution is the winner of the election.  If Donor 
Z has only $50,000 to split up between the candidates, it has only two viable choices:  it 
can give between $25,000-$50,000 to one candidate, or it can give $25,000 to each 
candidate.  Any other distribution of the money will result in one candidate receiving at 
least $1 but less than $25,000, and the money spent on that candidate will be wasted even 
if he wins.  This changes the way Donor Z’s valuation of the ex post benefit informs its 
splitting strategy—if the benefit is valued at less than $50,000, there is no point in 
splitting its donation equally even if each side has a 50 percent chance of winning the 
election.  Donor Z is better served spending $25,000 on one candidate and keeping the 
rest.
Similarly, marginal value also plays a part to the extent that there is an upper 
bound to the relationship between donation and expected benefit.  Let’s say Donor Z has 
$100,000, and plans to spend at least $50,000 of that money on Candidate A.  Assume 
also that Donor Z would receive no greater benefits from Candidate A by giving 
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$100,000 than he would by giving $50,000. Donor Z is better served spending its second 
$50,000 on Candidate B than on Candidate A, even if Candidate B is not likely to win the 
election.  If Donor Z gives $50,000 to each, it secures a positive result no matter the 
winner.  If Donor Z gives $100,000 to Candidate A, it secures no better result from 
Candidate A than if it had given $50,000, and receives no benefit should Candidate B 
happen to win.  Therefore, dollars $1-$50,000 to Candidate B have greater marginal 
value than dollars $50,001-$100,000 to Candidate A.  Richard Neuborne makes this point 
regarding free speech and political spending when he says, “even if one agrees that a 
close correlation exists between speech and the first dollar spent to fund it, or even the 
thousandth, or ten thousandth dollar, it does not follow that the one-to-one correlation 
between money and speech holds at the millionth, or ten millionth, or billionth dollar 
levels.”201  Therefore, whether or not the dollar-to-benefit relationship is linear or 
asymptotic (and, if the latter, at what point benefits cease to accrue) should inform a 
donor’s calculation of its contribution split.202
A final question regarding the apportionment of hedged-bet contributions: How 
might extreme splits in donations be explained, in which a miniscule amount is given to 
one side and a large amount to the other?  See the donation behavior of the United Auto 
Workers, mentioned earlier – from 1989-2002, UAW gave 99 percent of its money to 
Democrats, and only 1 percent to Republicans.203  Assuming that this disparity is the 
result of bet-hedging rather than donation-splitting, how is the 1 percent given to the 
GOP a useful outlay of money?  A potential explanation for this appears in the next 
section.
201
 Neuborne, supra note 4, at 115.
202 See Part III.B, supra, for further discussion on this point.
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C. When Do Donors Hedge Their Bets?
It seems logical that bet-hedging is more likely in close races.  This assumption is 
supported both by analysis (see Part IV.B) and observation204 – where the outcome of a 
race is uncertain, a donor desiring ex post benefits will have to spread its money in order 
to ensure having backed the eventual winner.  As Rep. Richard Baker (R-La.) said of the 
2004 presidential election, “If you think Kerry is going to win, but you’re not sure, you 
give to both sides.”205  Conversely, there is little reason for a donor to give to multiple 
candidates in a race that looks to be a landslide, unless the donor wishes to use their 
support for a doomed candidate as future political capital (“Hey, we supported your guy 
way back when!”).206  The desire to back only those candidates and parties that have 
legitimate chances of gaining political power must also explain why bet-hedging is 
confined to the two major parties (rather than, say, the Greens, the Libertarians, and the 
Socialists).207  The propensity of donors to hedge their bets in certain types of elections 
and not others is fertile ground for future empirical analysis; one such question might be 
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204 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 61, at B1 (“In a dizzying period stretching from September 2003 to August 
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207 See Part III.B, supra.
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whether bet-hedging is more likely in races with no incumbent candidates.  Probably so, 
since, as already noted, bet-hedging is more rational when the outcome of the race is less 
certain; because incumbents are almost always heavily favored, there is little point in 
donors hedging their bets.
More interesting is a question of information: does it matter if the parties or 
candidates themselves know that a donor is hedging its bets?  Is a party likely to treat a 
donor better if that donor did not give to the other side?  And even if parties accept bet-
hedging as a typical donor strategy, do they pay attention to the amount they are given 
relative to their competitor?  There is no clear answer to these questions.  As mentioned 
earlier, Republicans have taken steps to preference donors giving GOP candidates greater 
than 75 percent of their total contributions.208  Others, like Connecticut Democratic Party 
Chairman George Jepsen, believe that candidates care more about securing a donor’s 
money for themselves than about worrying whether the donor has also given to their 
opponent.209  And there is also some evidence that parties encourage, or at least exploit, 
the practice of giving to both sides.  Witness the testimony of a CEO, as quoted in 
McConnell v. FEC:
[I]f you're giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows. For 
many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only one 
side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have staff 
or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a 
certain committee has had their contributions to the other side noticed. 
They'll get a message that basically asks: 'Are you sure you want to be 
208
 Allen, supra note 92, at A11.  It is perhaps more predictable that non-bet-hedging donors have, in the 
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 Griffin, supra note 58, at 1 (quoting Jepsen saying that “[m]ost candidates have a lot more to worry 
about than perusing the other guy’s list and seeing who donated. . . .  If they gave to your opponent, you’re 
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giving only to one side? Don't you want to have friends on both sides of 
the aisle?' If your interests are subject to anger from the other side of the 
aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if you don't give. . . . 
[D]uring the 1990's, it became more and more acceptable to call someone, 
saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give to you or the 
person's opponent.210
Mention of the anonymous campaign finance system proposed by Ian Ayres and Jeremy 
Bulow is again appropriate here:211 if recipients of donations did not know who had 
contributed to them, there would be no way to present an ex post reward to those donors 
who gave to the winning team.  There would therefore be no reason to bet-hedge, as only 
the democratic preferences rationale for campaign contributions would hold sway.
Related is the possible use of donations to signal intensity of donor preferences.  
Many commentators have remarked on the cardinal nature of campaign contributions;212
this allows political actors to see how strongly contributors care about particular issues.  
Votes, by contrast, are binary expressions of preference which bundle the entirety of a 
political platform into a single valuation.  This may provide an explanation for extreme 
splits in contributions – perhaps giving 99 percent to one side and 1 percent to the other is 
akin to tipping a penny in a restaurant after receiving awful service.213  In this case, the 
donor wants the the recipient of the 99 percent to know how much more highly it values 
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them by giving them a benchmark of “anti-preference” by which to compare their own 
contribution.
V. Regulating Bet-Hedging
A. Can Bet-Hedging Be Regulated?
A normative argument in favor of formal curbs on hedged-bet behavior cannot 
easily be separated, at least at first, from an inquiry into the constitutionality of such 
regulation.  This is not to say that if the regulation of bet-hedging is constitutional it is 
normatively desirable.  Indeed, there is much government activity that is permissible but 
unwise.  But in this instance, the clearest thing to be said against bet-hedging is that it it 
lends itself, as I have argued, to a reasonable inference that those who hedge their bets do 
so with the expectation of receiving value for their dollars after the fact.  To the extent 
that this looks from the outside like political influence being exchanged for money, bet-
hedging behavior carries with it the appearance of corruption.214  And the appearance of 
corruption, even with nothing more, may constitutionally be regulated.  As the Buckley
Court stated, “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance 
of improper influence is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative 
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.”215
This is important because it is unclear whether bet-hedging has anything other 
than its unsavory appearance to recommend it for regulation.  There is no concrete 
evidence that explicit quid pro quos exist with hedged-bet donations any more than with 
donations to single candidates or parties (although they may, in both circumstances), and 
the increased access and facetime that political contributions will buy, while arguably 
214 See 124 S. Ct. at 663.
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undesirable, are probably not sufficiently compelling by themselves to support regulation 
as a constitutional matter.216  The Court’s definition of corruption has been drawn 
broadly, but not so broadly as to encompass mere access to candidates and officeholders.  
The appearance of corruption, however, is a compelling state interest on its own, and one 
which may take the sale of political access for money into account:
To be sure, mere favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is 
insufficient to justify regulation.  As the record demonstrates, it is the 
manner in which parties have sold access to federal candidates and 
officeholders that has given rise to the appearance of undue influence.  
Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of 
access is the suggestion that money buys influence.  It is no surprise then 
that purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to 
purchase just such influence.  It was not unwarranted for Congress to 
conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appearance of 
corruption.217
The reasons that the Court finds the appearance of corruption to be a compelling state 
interest are the same reasons that regulating bet-hedging because of its appearance of 
corruption would be a normatively desirable thing to do – notably, the prevention of “the 
eroding of public confidence in the electoral process” and the protection of “public 
participation in political debate.”218  “Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the 
appearance of undue influence,” the McConnell Court warns, “and the cynical 
assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to 
take part in democratic governance.”219  Favor-seeking, then, is undesirable societally for 
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the same reasons Congress’s desire to prevent it is given such weight in Buckley and 
McConnell: the existence of political quid pro quos, both in fact and in perception, erodes 
the legitimacy of our representative democracy, and raises disturbing questions of 
money-driven influence.  Despite this, commentators have suggested, often persuasively, 
that regulating on the basis of the appearance of corruption is an unworkable standard, 
and one which goes too far in corralling legitimate and harmless political behavior.220  It 
is certainly possible that remediation of the appearance of corruption engendered by bet-
hedging is not a good enough reason to pass a law forbidding the practice; I consider this 
below.  As a constitutional matter, though, I have little doubt that, were Congress or a 
state legislature to prohibit donations to competing candidates or competing parties 
within the same election cycle, the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality of 
the legislation on appearance of corruption grounds, especially given the Court’s own 
dicta on the subject.221  Of course, the Court could nevertheless strike down the 
legislation as not being sufficiently closely drawn, a danger which, as I discuss infra, 
might be particularly difficult to avoid when attempting to regulate bet-hedging.
The Court’s McConnell decision must surely stand as an indication that the 
constitutionality of political contribution limits is alive and well, so long as those limits 
can be tied to a compelling state interest.  One could argue, however, that any proposed 
regulation of bet-hedging would necessarily go further than did the legislation at issue in 
220 See, e.g., 124 S. Ct. at 731, 740-41 (opining that effective bribery laws would be sufficient to eliminate 
the appearance of corruption, and arguing that the appearance of corruption standard would allow Congress 
to pursue “outright regulation of the press”); La Pierre, supra note 6, at 1103 (the burden of justifying 
limits on contributions should be on the government, because “[a]ppearances are in the eye of the beholder, 
and an appearance of corruption may arise whenever an official votes or takes other actions consistent with 
the position of a contributor.”); Bauer, supra note 5, at 744-48; Ronald M. Levin, Fighting the Appearance 
of Corruption, 6 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 171, 174 (2001) (characterizing the appearance of corruption 
standard as “vague and subjective,” and proposing a new standard banning conduct “that tends toward 
corruption” (emphasis omitted)). 
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McConnell.  BCRA merely subjects all donations to national party committees to 
contribution limits under FECA; it doesn’t actually prohibit a contributor from giving to a 
particular candidate or party.  By contrast, regulating the practice of bet-hedging would 
more severely constrain the freedom of donors to give to whoever they want – a donor 
that had contributed to Mr. Dem would be forbidden from contributing to Mr. Dem’s 
competitor, Mrs. Gop, in the same election cycle.  Such a blanket restriction of free 
speech and associational rights goes beyond what the Court has so far sanctioned in its 
campaign finance jurisprudence.
There is some precedent for non-monetary limitations on donor freedom; the 
long-standing statutory prohibition on direct political contributions by corporations and 
unions comes immediately to mind.  Further, although denial of certiorari should not be 
taken as a comment on the merits of the lower court ruling, the Supreme Court has in the 
past few years declined to hear challenges to state supreme court decisions upholding 
legislation in which certain classes of donors (out-of-state residents, in Alaska, and the 
casino industry, in Louisiana) were prohibited from giving anything at all.222  And the 
fairly small scope of behavior that would be regulated by a ban on bet-hedging may be 
relevant as well.  As the McConnell Court noted, “not every minor restriction on parties’ 
otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension.”223
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B. Should Bet-Hedging Be Regulated?
In this paper, I have argued that bet-hedging, more than campaign contributions 
generally, suggests an expectation of influence on the part of the donor.  Indeed, bet-
hedging is almost paradigmatic in its elicitation of world-weary cynicism.  It has become 
a truism of campaign finance that big donors will give to both sides in order to ensure 
that they get in bed with the eventual winner.  But, constitutionality aside, is this a good 
enough reason to target bet-hedging for regulation?  As Jonathan Krasno and Frank 
Sorauf state, “citizens skeptical about the influence of large donations can find agreement 
from majorities in Congress, from donors, from lobbyists, from reporters and editorial 
writers, and from academics.”224  If the influence of money in politics is a problem, it is a 
problem in many more respects than donors giving to competing sides.  And, 
comparatively, the cynicism evoked by bet-hedging is peculiarly free of outrage; people 
may agree that it is not ideal, but that hedged-bet behavior ‘appears’ corrupt  is itself 
hardly responsible for all, or even many, of the ills of our campaign finance system.
So can a strong normative case for regulation be made without leaning too much 
on the “vague and subjective” argument of the appearance of corruption?225  This is a 
tricky question; most charges that can be levelled against bet-hedging apply equally to all 
forms of private campaign contributions, and some that hit their mark for campaign 
contributions in general, such as “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for [a] 
corporation’s political ideas,”226 are less clearcut when it comes to donations that 
neutralize each other by being given to competing candidates or parties, and that are 
224
 Krasno & Sorauf, supra note 6, at 132-33.
225
 Levin, supra note 220, at 174.
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forwarding a political idea not supported by the public only insofar as the idea itself is 
shared by the Democrats and Republicans receiving the contributions.  By the same 
token, however, bet-hedging could be said to be more pernicious than other forms of 
donation precisely because it isn’t, and can’t be, rationally justified by reference to 
democratic preferences or ideological sorting – to the extent opposing sides disagree, a 
donor is not forwarding its own policy views if it gives to both of them.  And to the 
extent the two sides agree, the donor arguably accrues just as much of a benefit if it saves 
its money, because its preferred policies will be forwarded regardless.  
Another response that distinguishes hedged-bet behavior from typical 
contributions and argues that the former should be prohibited even if the latter should not 
is the notion that neither donor nor recipient, at base, really want to be involved in the 
process of bet-hedging.  In effect, this argument posits a sort of prisoners’ dilemma: 
donors would rather not spend the money, candidates and officeholders would rather not 
stump for it, and both sides only persist in the practice out of fear that they will find 
themselves in competitive disadvantage to other donors and other candidates and 
officeholders if they do not.227  Under this conception, forced cessation of bet-hedging 
behavior would redound to the mutual benefit of all.228  Burt Neuborne’s observation that 
candidates’ “own best interests would almost certainly be served by mutually observed 
limits on campaign spending, but . . . unilateral action is fatal and a privately negotiated 
solution almost impossible to achieve” is equally relevant to candidates’ ceaseless 
226
 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
227 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1391 
n.9 (describing the prisoners’ dilemma faced by candidates who would rather not spend money on political 
advertising, but decide whether to do so “without knowing what other candidates will do”).
228 But see Birnbaum, supra note 28 (observing that the ability to raise money is viewed by many 
candidates as a positive characteristic).
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solicitation of campaign contributions;229 a former Congressman once told me that fully 
half of his waking life while in office was spent on the phone trying to reach his daily 
contribution goal.  And recall the testimony of the CEO that, because both parties know 
when a donor has given to one and not the other, and will often specifically solicit money 
from donors that have only made unilateral contributions, “there is a risk in giving to only 
one side.”230  In these respects, neither the act of giving nor the act of fundraising, 
especially in regard to hedged-bet donations, can be seen as wholly voluntary acts.231
Freeing both donors and politicians from the time- and money-consuming cycle of 
contributions may be as impossible as candidates agreeing to end the arms race of 
campaign spending, but imposing a prohibition on donations which, by their very nature, 
cancel each other out anyway is a legitimate reason to favor regulation of bet-hedging.232
The conclusion must be, I think, that there are good but not overwhelming 
arguments for prohibiting hedged-bet behavior.  Moreover, none of the bases for 
opposing campaign regulation in general resonate with especial strength when applied to 
contributions to competing candidates or parties.  Some, like the ideological sorting 
theory, are, if anything, less persuasive than usual.233  It is reasonable to oppose a 
regulatory response to bet-hedging on the grounds that it limits donor freedom qua donor 
freedom, but this freedom is not an absolute, and the value of eliminating such blatantly 
favor-seeking behavior as bet-hedging from the campaign finance framework is arguably 
229
 Neuborne, supra note 46, at 1067 (1999).
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 124 S. Ct. at 663 n.47 (quoting from McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 510 (D.D.C.) (2003)).
231 Cf. Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different?, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1617 (1999) (arguing that the lack of a 
government-imposed campaign spending cap hinders the autonomy of candidates and officeholders).
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 It may also be said that prohibiting donors from giving to directly competing candidates or parties is, 
comparatively, an extremely minimal burden on their speech and associative rights.  Under such a 
regulatory scheme, the donor would still be at liberty to donate to as many different candidates (in different 
parties!) as it liked, so long as they were not running against each other.
233 See generally Bronars & Lott, supra note 12.
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not insignificant.  Finally, the civic patriotism argument – that donors who give to both 
sides are contributing to a vibrant democracy and making the democratic political process 
itself more fully possible – has some strength but, as an initial matter at least, is not 
convincing: it is a striking proposition indeed, and one which requires evidentiary 
support, that were the total contributions of all bet-hedging donors roughly halved,234 our 
system of democratic governance would ultimately be very much worse off.
Nevertheless, every act of regulation has unexpected costs and unintended 
consequences,235 and there is reason to think that regulating bet -hedging would create 
more problems than it solves.  First, it is unclear that a prohibition on giving to competing 
candidates or parties would actually deter hedged-bet behavior.  There is a potential 
hydraulic effect, providing incentive for donors to redouble their presence in Washington 
D.C. (or, if the bet-hedging prohibition is statewide, in the state capital) through other 
means, such as lobbying.236  Second, although the effects of bet-hedging regulation on 
donor behavior can only be inferred, it seems likely that a ban on bet-hedging, if effective 
as a deterrent, would either force large donors to choose a side (or sides, when giving in 
multiple races) at which to direct the whole of their contributions, or result in them 
leaving the campaign finance playing field entirely.  Both of these scenarios could result 
in an outcome more normatively undesirable than bet-hedging itself.  
For the first, donors could either continue giving relative to their historic levels 
(that is, the $6.5 million that Goldman Sachs has split evenly between the Democrats and 
234
 This is an intentional over-simplification; as we shall see, the likely effects of a ban on bet-hedging are
far less clear than this.
235 See generally Sunstein, supra note 227; Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 407 (1990); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998) (surveying 
theories on the relative values and limitations of direct and indirect government regulatory responses).
236 Cf. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 13.
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Republicans in the 2004 cycle237 would all still be contributed in a post-regulation 
regime, just in ways that do not constitute bet-hedging), or, because they no longer have 
to give to both sides in a particular race, drastically lower their total giving (so Goldman 
Sachs would save around $3 million),238 essentially halving the overall contributions to 
each side.  If donors continued to give as much money as they do now, and simply 
targeted it in more concentrated doses, this would conceivably trigger a reaction on the 
part of candidates and parties competing for the larger slices of the pie.  Competing 
candidates might be drawn together centripetally in order to maximize their appeal to the 
widest swath of donors, if bet-hedging were prohibited, or they might seek to separate 
themselves and stake out newly distinct policy positions to make themselves the clear 
choice of discerning donors.  If, instead, contributors lowered their total amount of 
giving, this would also force candidates and parties to adjust, either by spending less 
money or by seeking alternative sources of campaign funds.  The latter may be more 
feasible than ever, now that Howard Dean has revitalized grassroots fundraising.239
Alternatively, regulation of bet-hedging might push some corporate donors out of 
the practice of giving money altogether.  While it is unlikely that a desire to be seen as 
non-ideological drives institutional donors to hedge their bets in the first place,240 a 
reflexive fear of being seen as too ideological (or even an inability to come to a 
consensus among its officers regarding which candidates and parties to support) might 
cause large donors who are forbidden from bet-hedging to severely cut their level of 
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240 See Part IV.B, supra.
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campaign contributions, especially if, as noted above, there are other avenues (like 
lobbying) by which they can try to gain access and influence.  Institutional donors might 
simply play it safe, weighing the marginal value of contributing to one side in an 
uncertain election as less than the benefit the donors could expect to receive if their guy 
were to win, and withdraw entirely. If this happens, fears of undercutting or destabilizing 
a democratic process that, for good or ill, is powered by large campaign contributions 
start to become justified.  As a counterpoint, it is perhaps useful to note that BCRA’s 
sweeping restrictions on sizeable donations have not appreciably, as yet, contributed to 
the downfall of our political system.
A prohibition on bet-hedging would likely remove some money from politics –
perhaps a great deal of money. Say a Donor Z gives $x to Candidate A and $y to 
competing Candidate B, where both amounts are the product of some presumptively 
rational calculus in which the donor takes into account the likelihood that each candidate 
will win, the amount (and proportion) given to the candidates by other donors, the 
ideological resonance of each candidate with the donor (on the one hand, a resonant 
candidate will be more likely to pursue policies favorable to the donor without a large 
contribution; on the other hand, giving a lot of money to a non-resonant candidate might 
be utterly futile), and so on. Now say bet-hedging is prohibited.  The donor can 1) give 
money to one of the two candidates; 2) give money to neither of the two candidates; or 3) 
violate the law and give money to both of the candidates.  Assuming decent enforcement 
mechanisms, let's discount the likelihood of 3).  Even if the Donor Z chooses 1), it is
extremely unlikely to continue to donate $x+$y.  (Although the closer the election, the 
more likely it would be that the donor would give as much in a non-bet-hedging world as 
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it would in a bet-hedging world.) The calculus is completely different.  It's hardly even 
clear that the donor would necessarily give $x or $y to the candidate; the revised donation 
amount might be smaller than either.
The framing of bet-hedging regulation is also problematic.  Specifically, it is 
difficult to word the restrictions so that they will eliminate obvious loopholes that would 
allow the practice of bet-hedging to continue while remaining sufficiently closely drawn 
as to withstand constitutional scrutiny.  As an example, a statute that treats all employees 
of Donor Z as a single entity for the purposes of regulating bet-hedging – so that Joe in 
Accounting couldn’t give to the DNC if Amy in Personnel had already given to the RNC 
– is almost ridiculously untenable, and would surely be struck down by the courts if it 
were, by some fluke, passed into law.  But many alternative formulations of the statute 
would allow donors, if they chose, to bundle employee contributions in such a way as to 
continue, effectively, to give money to both sides.241  Perhaps a prohibition on corporate 
officers, their spouses, and corporate PACs would be narrowly drawn enough to prevent 
overbreadth while regulating most or all hedged-bet behavior.
VI. Conclusion
It may be that a regulatory cure for bet-hedging is worse than the disease itself.  
But this does not mean that the practice of giving to competing candidates or parties is 
necessarily benign, or that the subject does not warrant greater attention and analysis.  In 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, the Court stated that:
In speaking [in Buckley v. Valeo] of “improper influence” and 
“opportunities for abuse” in addition to “quid pro quo arrangements,” we 
recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but 
241 See The Center for Responsive Politics, “Bundling,” at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/law_bagtricks/loop5.asp (last visited August 16, 2004).
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extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the 
wishes of large contributors.  These were the obvious points behind our 
recognition that Congress could constitutionally address the power of 
money “to influence governmental action” in ways “less blatant and 
specific” than bribery.
Donor bet-hedging, in appearing to distill the act of contributing money to a simple 
calculus of covering one’s own bases because one has the resources to do so, fits squarely 
within the sort of behavior that has been looked on with opprobrium by scholars, judges, 
legislators, and the public alike.  Unless and until it is impractical or impossible, as it 
would be under a system of anonymous giving,242 for a well-heeled donor to achieve 
recognition – and through it increased access and a maximized chance at ex post
influence – simply by spreading its money amongst all legitimate candidates for a 
political office, bet-hedging will be endemic to our system of campaign finance.  If we do 
not wish to regulate it, we should at least attempt to understand it.    
242 See generally Ayres & Bulow, supra note 53.
